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Contracting Betrothals 
Ideally, couples in late medieval Italy contracted a valid Christian marriage in three stages: 
betrothal (sponsalia) through words of future consent (consensus per verba de futuro); marriage 
(matrimonium) through words of present consent (consensus per verba de presenti), which alone 
sufficed to establish a valid, indissoluble union; and consummation through sexual intercourse, 
which transformed a de futuro marriage into an indissoluble union, while it brought to full 
perfection a de presenti marriage. The minimum legal age for giving de futuro consent under 
canon and civil law was seven years; for de presenti consent, the couple had to have attained 
puberty: as a rule, twelve for girls, fourteen for boys1 . Previous studies of sponsalia in medieval 
Europe have generally focused on canon law doctrines and the disputes adjudicated before 
ecclesiastical courts2 . Our study differs in that it also highlights the varied ways in which betrothals 
were actually contracted and the municipal law procedures and civil law regulations and doctrines 
that applied to betrothals. In particular, we focus on betrothals contracted by merchant families in 
late Trecento Florence. To that end, we examine two opinions (consilia) of the distinguished 
Perugian jurist Angelus de Ubaldis (d. 1400), which offer valuable insights into the making and 
breaking of Florentine betrothal contracts. Apart from presenting new documentary data, our 
study offers new entry points for the study of betrothal contracts in late medieval Italy. 
Knowledge of Florentine betrothals derives from two principal sources: private ricordanze and 
betrothal and marriage contracts drafted by public notaries. Compiled by the heads of merchant 
Florentine households, ricordanze constitute a unique record of business and financial 
transactions, vital events (births, marriages, and deaths), and observations on contemporaneous 
social and political events and personages3 . Even though references in ricordanze to prenuptial, 
nuptial, and postnuptial acts and rites were usually  formulaic, they nevertheless provide invaluable 
                                                 
* We are very grateful for the timely and generous assistance we received from our friends and colleagues Angela De 
Benedictis, Maria Grazia Nico Ottaviani, and Susanne Lepsius. The following abbreviations have been employed: ASF 
(Archivio di Stato di Firenze), BNF (Biblioteca Nazionale di Firenze), and NA (Notarile Antecosimiano). The 
Florentine new year began on March 25th. In the interest of readability, all dates between January 1 st  and March 25th in 
the text are modernized; to avoid confusion, however, all dates in the footnotes are given according to both modern 
and Florentine conventions. The research was partly subsidized by  Nanzan University, Nagoya-Seto, Pache I-A. 
1  R. METZ, “L’enfant dans le droit canonique médiéval”, L’enfant, pt. 2: Europe médiévale et moderne  (Recueils de la 
Société Jean Bodin, vol. 36) (Bruxelles 1976), pp. 23ff.  
2 For a general overview of Christian marriage, with an excellent bibliography, see J. GAUDEMET, Le marriage en 
Occident. Le moeurs et le droit  (Paris 1987). On the legal issues and doctrines relating to sponsalia, see A. ESMEIN, Le 
mariage en droit canonique  (Paris 1891), vol. I; J. DAUVILLIER, Le mariage dans le droit classique de l’Église depuis le 
‘Decret de Gratien’ (1140) jusqu’à la mort de Clément V (1314) (Paris 1933); P. RASI, La conclusione del matrimonio 
nella dottrina prima del Concilio di Trento  (Naples 1958), pp. 32-76; J. GAUDEMET, Les étapes de la conclusion du lien 
matrimonial chez Gratien et ses commentateurs, sociétés et marriages (Strasbourg 1980), pp. 379-391; ID., Le 
marriage en Occident, 169-171; C. VALSECCHI, “Causa matrimonialis est gravis et ardua. Consiliatores e matrimonio 
fino al Concilio di Trento”, in Studi di storia del diritto II (Milan 1999), pp. 463-472. On the glossators, see P. RASI, “Il 
diritto matrimoniale nei glossatori”, in Studi di storia e diritto in onore di Carlo Calisse  (Milan 1939), vol. 1, pp. 129-
158; C. DONAHUE, JR., “The Case of the Man Who Fell into the Tiber: The Roman Law of Marriage at the Time of the 
Glossators”, American Journal of Legal History  22 (1978): 1-53. For actual cases, see J.-PH. LEVY, “L’officialité de 
Paris et les questions familiales à la fin du XIVe siecle”, in Études d’histoire du dro it canonique dédiées à G. Le Bras 
(Paris 1965), pp. 1266-1274; C. MEEK, “Women, the Church, and the Law: Matrimonial Litigation in Lucca under 
Bishop Nicolao Guinigi (1394-1435)”, in Chattel, Servant or Citizen. Women’s Status in Church, State and Society , M. 
O’Dowd and S. Wichert (edd) (Belfast 1995), pp. 82-85. 
3 A. CICCHETTI and R. MORDENTI, I libri di famiglia in Italia, I, Filologia e storiografia letteraria  (Rome 1985); C. 
KLAPISCH-ZUBER, La maison et le nom. Stratégies et rituels dans l’Italie de la Renaissance  (Paris 1990); G. CHERUBINI, 
“I libri di ricordanze  come fonte storica”, in Scritti toscani. L’urbanesimo medievale e la mezzadria (Florence 1991), 
pp. 269-287; G. CIAPPELLI, Una famiglia e le sue ricordanze. I Castellani di Firenze nel Tre-Quattrocento  (Florence 
1995). 
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details on the circumstances engendering new unions. The leader among the historians employing 
ricordanze for family history is Klapisch-Zuber, whose essay “Zacharias, or the Ousted Father” has 
illuminated the sequence and meanings of the rites culminating in a legally valid marriage in 
Florence4 . 
The Florentine prenuptial scenario was premised on the primacy of the family - on the cultural 
conviction that marriages are generated by families, in contrast to today’s prevailing conviction, at 
least in the West, that families are generated by marriages. By convention the scenario began when 
a household head (father, widowed mother, senior male kinsman) enlisted the services of a 
marriage broker (sensale) to find a spouse for marriageable daughters and sons. Not only were 
marriages arranged for girls who were customarily thought of as weak-minded, it was legally and 
morally incumbent on a paterfamilias to arrange marriages on their behalf with men whose social 
worth approximated that of his own family. A marriageable son, who became a household head on 
the death of his father, also relied on marriage brokers. Other intermediaries (mezzani), normally 
immediate kin and friends, were enlisted to assist in the negotiations. A private meeting between 
the parties and their kinsmen followed successful preliminary negotiations. At this meeting the 
representatives of the prospective spouses concluded an alliance between the two families 
(fermare il parentado), which was emphatically affirmed by a ritual handclasp (impalamento)5 . It 
was common for the parties, often after wheeling and dealing, to settle on the amount of the dowry 
the future bridegroom would receive upon marriage. From the fifteenth century on, prenuptial 
arrangements were normally recorded in a scritta, a private written agreement safeguarded by the 
intermediaries. There is no hint that Florentines cast horoscopes, as is done in India today, to 
determine the compatibility of the prospective spouses and the most auspicious time for the 
wedding. 
The expression fermare il parentado was the social equivalent of fermare una compagnia, the 
expression for forming a business company. The commercial component of alliance making and 
matchmaking became a convenient target for moralists and was satirized by the novellieri Franco 
Sacchetti and Giovanni Sercambi and the poet Antonio Cammelli of Pistoia. In referring to 
prenuptial negotiations as la mercanzia Sacchetti meant to underscore that matchmaking in 
Florence was little more than a commercial venture6 . Cammelli (1436-1502) was critical of the 
social script in which nubile girls were loveless pawns of venal parents and grubby marriage 
brokers. One of his sonnets depicts a widowed mother as reprehensibly impatient to find a 
husband for her daughter7 . Pietro, the marriage broker, informs her that he has found a suitable 
groom who is not only rich but also “virtuous, polite, and well attired, and has never uttered a bad 
word”. She tells Pietro “he will have in exchange a charming girl. She can do what he wishes and in 
her behavior is chaste, respectable, docile, and beautiful”. Her mother promises a dowry of a 
                                                 
4 “Zacharie, ou le père évincé. Les rituels nuptiaux toscans entre Giotto et le Concile de Trente”, Annales, E.S.C. 34 no. 
6 (1979): 1216-1243. We cite the English translation: “Zacharias, or the Ousted Father: Nuptial Rites in Tuscany 
between Giotto and the Council of Trent”, in Women, Family, and Ritual in Renaissance Italy , translated by Lydia G. 
Cochrane (Chicago 1985), pp. 178-212. On betrothal practices in the Roman world, see the engaging and informative 
discussion of S. TREGGIARI, Roman Marriage. Iusti Coniuges from the Time of Cicero to the Time of Ulpian (Oxford 
1991), pp. 83-160; and J. E. GRUBBS, Law and Family in Late Antiquity. The Emperor Constantine’s Marriage 
Legislation (Oxford 1995), pp. 140-182. See also R. ASTOLFI’s detailed Il fidanzamento nel diritto romano  (Padua 
1989). For comparisons between Italian and Northern European betrothal and marriage rituals, see L. SEIDEL, Jan 
Van Eyck’s Arnolfini Portrait: Stories of an Icon (Cambridge 1993); and E. HALL, The Arnolfini Betrothal. Medieval 
Marriage and the Enigma of Van Eyck’s Double Portrait (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London 1994). 
5 The Glossa explained that the meaning of pactum derived from a striking of the palms. See the gloss Percussit to l. 
Sciendum (D. 50.15.1): “id est pactum fecit, nam dicitur a percussione palmarum”; and the gloss Pactum to l. Huius 
edicti (D. 2.14.1.1), after Accursius has given Isidore’s ethymology of “pactum”, he states: “Vel dicitur pactum a 
percussione palmarum”. The term impalmare , which is now a literary or facetious term, originally  meant “to promise 
a girl as a bride” as well as “to shake someone’s hand as a sign of agreement”. 
6 F. SACCHETTI, Il Trecentonovelle , V. Marucci (ed) (Rome 1996), novella 189, pp. 638-641 ; G. SERCAMBI, Novelle, G. 
Sinicropi (ed) (Florence 1995), novella 8, pp. 127 -140, esp. 127 -128. For a discussion of young adolescent girls who 
were pressured into hasty marriages in the literary context of Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet, see B. W. YOUNG, 
“Haste, Consent, and Age of Marriage: Some Implications of Social History for Romeo and Juliet”, Iowa State Journal 
of Research 62 (1988): 459-474. 
7  I sonetti del Pistoia, giusta L’Apografo Trivuliziano , R. Renier (ed) (Turin 1888), p. 53. 
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thousand gold ducats, half of which she agrees to pay in advance. Eager to conclude the match, she 
instructs Pietro to see to it “that the young man be informed. Act in earnest! Conduct the deal and 
let the contract be signed”. In order to be paid, Pietro quickly arranges the business, and the 
parties conclude the contract at breakneck speed (in un punto il col scavezza)8 . Cammelli’s 
disapproval of the marriage market most likely amused his knowing audience, yet, as we argue 
below, there were sound reasons for the rush to marriage. 
Soon after the agreement to fermare il parentado, the couple was solemnly betrothed or espoused 
(giuramento, compromesso) in the presence of witnesses. It was the sponsa’s (future bride’s) legal 
and moral protector - father, widowed mother, brother, or kinsman - who publicly promised that 
he or she would ensure that the absent bride-to-be would give her future consent to take the 
sponsus (bridegroom) as her lawful husband, to contract marriage with him, and to receive from 
him a ring signifying the legitimate union of the couple. Faithfully reflecting practice, sponsae were 
typically absent in literary representations of prenuptial negotiations and the giuramento. 
Florentines would have undoubtedly endorsed Petrus de Ancharano’s admonition that it was 
unnecessary for the prospective bride and bridegroom to know each other personally for the 
purpose of contracting betrothals or marriages 9 . Indeed, canon and Roman law sanctioned 
betrothals and marriages contracted between people who were absent (inter absentes)1 0. Marriage 
by proxy still remains a possibility in contemporary Italy. Courts have allowed them to occur when 
one of the parties lives abroad and compelling reasons exist for the marriage to proceed. 
No indication is given in ricordanze or other sources that Florentine couples, as other couples in 
Europe, treated “betrothal as a trial marriage and normally slept together once they had exchanged 
future consent”1 1 . While marriages per verba de futuro carnali copula subsecuta were fairly 
common throughout Europe before the Council of Trent1 2 , Florentine merchant families intent on 
preserving their honor were successful in keeping contact between sponsae/sponsi de futuro to a 
minimum. The constraints on the sexuality of upper-class unmarried women, on the other hand, 
contrast with the lack of constraints on low-status rural and urban youth, for whom “premarital 
intercourse was evidently accepted and widespread, as long as relations were initiated with an 
intent to marry, or at least create a stable bond” 1 3 . High-status male predators, however, habitually 
seduced gullible low-status girls and women with promises to marry at a future time, which they 
had no intention of keeping. 
                                                 
8 The verse, “a tutti due in punto il col scavezza” is typically - and wrongly - understood by both editors and 
commentators to mean that the broker had broken the necks of the betrothed with one blow. See, for example, Sonetti 
di Antonio Cammelli detto il Pistoia, A. Cappelli and S. Ferrari (edd) (Livorno 1884), p. 271, n. 20. On this point, we 
appreciate the assistance of our colleagues Elissa Weaver and Gabriella Zarri. 
9 For Petrus de Ancharano ’s view, see J. BRUNDAGE, Law, Sex, and Christian Society in Medieval Europe  (Chicago 
1987), p. 497 . 
1 0  J. BANCAREL , Le mariage entre absents en droit canonique (Toulouse 1919). According to Grubb, “Veneto 
memoirs ... indicate that the girl’s consent to a future union, if indeed it was even sought, was not regarded as worth 
recording”. See J. GRUBB, Provincial Families of the Renaissance: Private and Public Life in the Veneto  (Baltimore 
1996), p. 9. 
1 1  Quotation from BRUNDAGE, Law, Sex, and Christian Society, pp. 436-437, who suggests that premarital sex was 
common in rural France, England, and Corsica. See also R. WEIGAND, “Ehe- und Familienrecht in der mittelalterlichen 
Stadt”, in Liebe und Ehe im Mittelalter (Goldbach 1993), pp. 343-387, esp. 372-7 3; E. LE ROY LADURIE, Montaillou, 
Cathars and Catholic in a French Village, 1294-1324 , translated by B. Bray (New York 1980), pp. 139-178; P. J. P. 
GOLDBERG , Women in England c. 1275-1525. Documentary Sources (Manchester and New York 1995), p. 9: “The 
impression gleaned from church court records is that few young women would consent to sex until an agreement to 
marriage had been made”. 
12 A. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, “Regle et réalité dans le droit matrimonial à la fin du moyen age”, Revue de droit canonique 
28 (1978): 210-217; G. ZARRI, “Il matrimonio tridentino”, in Recinti: Donne, clausura e matromonio nella prima età 
moderna (Bologna 2000), pp. 243-248. 
13 Quotation from M. ROCKE, “Gender and Sexual Culture in Renaissance Italy”, in Gender and Society in Renaissance 
Italy, J. C. Brown and R. Davis (edd) (London and New York 1998), p. 162. G. Ruggiero dubs Venetian antenuptial 
fornication as “fornication and then marriage”. See his The Boundaries of Eros. Sex Crime and Sexuality in 
Renaissance Venice (New York and Oxford 1985), pp. 16-44; and G. CAZZETTA’s brilliant Praesumitur seducta. Onestà 
e consenso femminile nella cultura giuridica moderna (Florence 1999), pp. 51ff. For Aragon, see M. I. FALCON-PEREZ, 
“Le mariage en Aragon au XV siècle”, in La femme dans l’histoire et la société méridionales (IXe-XIXe s.) (Montpellier 
1995), pp. 159ff.  
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In his turn, the sponsus promised that he would take the sponsa as his lawful wife. If the sponsus 
could not give his de futuro promise to marry, because he had not yet reached the age of fourteen, 
the promise would be made by his father or close kinsman. When a sponsus of legal age was absent 
from the city, the promise to marry at a future time would be given by a duly  appointed agent, 
which was how the Florentine lay canonist Lorenzo d’Antonio Ridolfi was betrothed. On April 2, 
1388, Niccolò Ridolfi, acting as Lorenzo’s agent, made an agreement with the Barucci family 
committing his brother to future marriage with Caterina Barucci. At the time, the twenty-six-old 
Lorenzo was in Bologna, having just passed his doctoral examination in canon law at the city’s 
university. The giuramento took place on April 20, with Niccolò again acting as his brother’s agent, 
promising that Lorenzo would take Caterina as his lawful wife (per verba de futuro). The following 
July, having returned to Florence, Lorenzo met his wife for the first time1 4 . The giuramento 
customarily included an agreement on the date of marriage and the composition of the dowry - 
namely, cash, credits in the public debt (monte comune), goods, and real property. If the betrothed 
had not yet reached puberty, the parties agreed to entrust mutually acceptable intermediaries 
(prudentes et discreti viri) with the decision of establishing the date of marriage and the 
composition of the dowry (as in Angelus’s consilium II below). 
The sponsus was not required to pledge his fidelity by placing a ring on the sponsa’s finger. Nor 
was the exchange of a kiss obligatory1 5 . In Florence, the absence of the sponsa at the formal 
betrothal made the betrothal ring and kiss moot. The Roman law prohibition still in force against 
interspousal gifts did not apply to gifts exchanged by a couple betrothed but unmarried. After the 
giuramento was concluded, it was customary for the sponsus to pledge his fidelity by sending to 
his betrothed a chest (forzerino) containing rings, precious stones, belts, and other goods, and by 
celebrating the betrothal with a dinner at his future in-laws’ house. A sponsa’s acceptance of gifts 
in anticipation of marriage established a presumption, unless contrary proof was produced, that 
she had given her consent to the betrothal made on her behalf1 6 . Betrothal gifts were treated 
neither as the Roman donatio propter nuptias1 7  nor as the Germanic morgengabe1 8 , nor even as 
earnest money or a pledge, which the sponsus would forfeit in the event he failed to fulfill the 
betrothal contract. The betrothal gifts belonged to the husband, and he could demand the return of 
them at any time1 9 . The 1372 statutes of Lucca likewise emphasized that ownership of both 
                                                 
14  BNF, Panciatichiano, 147 (Zibaldone di Lorenzo Ridolfi), fol. 2v: “Memoria insuper quod die IIa aprilis 1388 
Nicolaus germanus meus firmavit in uxorem pro me filiam Angeli de Baruccciis de Florentia, Caterine nomine, et 
vocatam Pichinam, et die XXa eiusdem, idem Nicholaus per verba de futuro, nomine meo, desponsavit eamdem, et de 
IIIa maii anni predicti misit sibi forzerinum iuxta morem consuetum. Et ego eam vidi solum die XIIa julii anni predicti”. 
Our transcription slightly differs from F. MARTINO, “Umanisti, giuristi, uomini di stato a Firenze fra Trecento e 
Quattrocento. Lorenzo d’Antonio Ridolfi”, in Studi in memoria di Mario Condorelli (Milan 1988), p. 186, n. 43. 
1 5 On the origins of these rituals, see the superb study of L. ANNE, Les rites des fiançailles et la donation pour cause de 
marriage sous le bas-empire  (Louvain 1941), pp. 5-238. See also ASTOLFI, Il fidanzamento , pp. 143ff. For the Middle 
Ages, F.  BRANDILEONE, “Contributi allo studio della subarrhatio ”, in Saggi sulla storia della celebrazione del 
matrimonio in Italia (Milan 1906), pp. 401ff; P. RASI, “La conclusione del matrimonio prima del Concilio di Trento”, 
Rivista di storia del diritto italiano  16 (1943): 264ff; G. ZANETTI, “Sul valore giuridico della subharrhatio anulo  nei riti 
nuziali del medioevo italico”, Rivista italiana di scienze giuridiche 18 (1943): 3-134; E. CATTANEO , “La celebrazione 
delle nozze a Milano”, Archivio ambrosiano  29 (1976): 142-180; K.  STEPHENSON, Nuptial Blessing. A Study of 
Christian Marriage Rights  (New York 1983); O. NICCOLI, “Baci rubati. Gesti e riti nunziali in Italia prima e dopo il 
Concilio di Trento”, in Il gesto nel rito e nel cerimoniale dal mondo antico ad oggi (Florence 1995), pp. 224-244. 
16 ABBAS PANORMITANUS, Consilia  (Venice 1578), fol. 32r, cons. 48. Prenuptial gifts were also treated as valid evidence 
in breach-of-promise suits in Victorian England. See G. FROST, Promises Broken: Courtship, Class and Gender in 
Victorian England (Charlottesville and London 1995), p. 30. 
1 7  M. BELLOMO, Ricerche sui rapporti patrimoniali tra coniugi. Contributo alla storia della famiglia medievale  (Milan 
1961), pp. 27 -60 and 223-244. 
18 B. M. KREUTZ, “The Twilight of the Morgengabe”, in Portraits of Medieval and Renaissance Living: Essays in 
Honor of David Herlihy, S. K. Cohn and S.  A. Epstein (edd) (Ann Arbor 1996), pp. 131 -47. See also R. BRACCIA , “Uxor 
gaudet de morte mariti: la donatio propter nuptias  tra diritto comune e diritti locali”, Annali della Facoltà di 
Giurisprudenza di Genova 30 (2000-2001): 7 6-128. 
19 T. M. IZBICKI, “Ista questio est antiqua: Two Consilia on Widows Rights”, Bulletin of Medieval Canon Law  8 (1978): 
48-49; M. T. GUERRA MEDICI, L’aria di città: donne e diritti nel comune medievale  (Naples 1996), pp. 39ff; J. F. 
BESTOR, “The Groom’s Prestations for the Ductio in Late Medieval Italy: A Study in the Disciplining Power of 
Liberalitas”, RIDC 8 (1997): 141ff; and her “Marriage Transactions in Renaissance Italy and Mauss’s Essay on the Gift”, 
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prenuptial and nuptial gifts was not transferred to the wife (non intelligantur esse mulieris nec 
intelligatur translatum dominium a sponso in sponsam), and thus, apart from wedding rings, 
they had to be restored upon demand to the husband or his heirs2 0. 
Later - sometimes days, sometimes months, and, on occasion, years later - the couple contracted 
marriage through an exchange of words of present consent, followed by the annelamento, the 
ringing of the bride. According to Florentine jurists, the groom’s giving of the ring and bride’s 
reception constituted extrinsic signs (signa extrinseca) or presumptive evidence of marriage2 1 . 
Marriage vows were almost always performed in the bride’s home. Ricordanze include details 
about the wedding festivities; the composition and exchange of nuptial gifts; the transfer of the 
dowry, in part or whole; the husband’s acknowledgement of the dowry in a notarial instrument 
called confessio dotis; the time and place of the marriage’s consummation; and the introduction of 
the bride into the husband’s household. 
As Klapisch-Zuber has observed2 2 , before the decrees of the Council of Trent, which made the 
validity of the nuptial rite dependent on the presence of the priest and his blessing, it was the 
notary who officiated at the betrothal and marriage and who attested to the solemn exchange of 
consent between the parties2 3 . As canon law validated not only the substitution of public notaries 
for priests at betrothal and marriage ceremonies, but also the legal effects of these solemn 
exchanges of consent, it is anachronistic to treat these ceremonies as civic and secular and distinct 
from religious rites. In contrast to the private setting of the ceremony of marriage, betrothals 
among upper-level families in the late Trecento and early Quattrocento were customarily 
celebrated in church and typically presided over by a notary. The betrothal of Lena di Bernardo 
Sassetti in 1384, for example, was celebrated in the church of the Cistercian Badia Fiorentina, the 
city’s richest monastery (appendix 1). During this period, public notice of the impending marriage 
was not given. And objections to the marriage were seldom interposed, probably because 
betrothals violating the church’s prohibition against consanguineous marriages, at least among 
Florence’s merchant families, were rare2 4 . The public and solemn setting of the Florentine 
betrothals, however, was designed to accomplish two critical tasks. First, the public betrothal 
announced to the community that a socially and politically consequential alliance between the two 
families had been sealed. Second, it announced that the betrothed were spoken for and that they 
had exited the marriage market. It was now difficult for one of the parties to unilaterally or 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Past and Present 164 (1999): 6-46; and, of course, C. KLAPISCH-ZUBER’s classic  essay, “The Griselda Complex: Dowry 
and Marriage Gifts in the Quattrocento”, in Women, Family and Ritual, pp. 213-246. 
20 Archivio di Stato of Lucca, Statuti del Comune di Lucca, 6, fol. 144v, lib. IV, rub. CCXXXII, De anulo sponsalatio et 
de donamentis sponse a sponso factis. 
21  See the consilium  of the lay canon lawyer, Stefano di Giovanni Buonaccorsi, with subscriptiones by Filippo di 
Tommaso Corsini and Lorenzo Ridolfi in BNF, Magl. II, II, 370, fol. 7 r-7v. The consilium was penned in March 
1412/13. 
22 KLAPISCH-ZUBER, “Zacharias”, pp. 184-186. See also D. D’AVRAY, “Marriage Ceremonies and the Church in Italy after 
1215”, in Marriage in Italy. 1300-1650, T. Dean and K. J. P. Lowe (edd) (Cambridge 1998), pp. 107 -115. 
23 Perugia attempted to thwart breaches of promise of future marriage by requiring the redaction of sponsalia by a 
public notary. See Statuto del Comune di Perugia del 1279, S. Caprioli (ed) (Perugia 1996), vol. 1, p. 361, rubric 386: 
Qualiter fiat contractus de sponsalitiis: “Statuimus quod quando aliquis desposaverit uxorem, de sponsalitiis fieri 
faciat publicum instrumentum, ut ab aliqua partium in posterum non valeat negari”. On the role of the notary in 
redacting sponsalia and marriage agreements, see P. LEISCHING, “Eheschliessungen vor dem No tar im 13. 
Jahrhundert”, ZRG, Kan. Abt. 94 (1997): 20-46; M. G. DI RENZO V ILLATA, “Il volto della famiglia medievale tra practica 
e teoria nella Summa totius artis notariae”, in Rolandino e l’ars notaria da Bologna all’Europa, G. Tamba (ed) (Milan 
2002), pp. 384-396. A Bolognese sponsalium contract of 1210 is published by G. TAMBA , Un corporazione per il potere. 
Il notariato a Bologna in età comunale  (Bologna 1988), pp. 127 -130. The statutes of Perugia and Rolandino 
Pasaggeri’s notarial manual leave the impression that sponsalia contracts redacted by notaries were common. Our 
research in the notarial records of Trecento Bologna and Perugia, necessarily restricted and preliminary, does not lend 
support to this impression. In our investigation of several dozen filze  in the Archivi di Stato of Perugia and Bologna we 
found countless contracts of marriage and confessiones dotium but not a single betrothal contract. We wish to express 
our appreciation to Paola Monacchia, Director of the Archivio di Stato of Perugia, and Maria Rosaria Celli Giorgini, 
Director of the Archivio di Stato of Bologna, for generously facilitating our research. 
24 KLAPISCH-ZUBER, “Zacharie”, pp. 184-185; A.  MOLHO, Marriage Alliance in Late Medieval Florence (Cambridge, 
Mass. 1994), pp. 256ff; G. A. BRUCKER, “Ecclesiastical Courts in Fifteenth-Century Florence and Fiesole”, in 
Renaissance Florence: Society, Culture and Religion (Goldbach 1994), p. 320. 
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arbitrarily abandon the betrothal without losing honor and without inflicting dishonor on the 
aggrieved party2 5 . 
In his sample of Florentine betrothal and marriage contracts in the Trecento, Cohn found that 
contracts of marriage far outnumbered betrothal contracts, by nine to one 2 6 . What explains the 
large difference? Families in late medieval Italy, with some exceptions, practiced informal 
betrothals or simply married without prenuptial formalities. The large majority of indiv iduals who 
married did not grasp (as Angelus observed in consilium II) the subtle and consequential 
distinction between verba de futuro and de presenti, to which medieval jurists and theologians 
devoted obsessive attention2 7 . We agree with Cohn’s suggestion that notarized betrothal contracts 
were commissioned “almost exclusively” by the wealthy and by families with surnames, a badge of 
prominence. Our own examination of sixteen Florentine sponsalia contracts recorded in the 
register of the notary Francesco di Piero Giacomini, spanning four years, from March 1418 to 
March 1422, supports Cohn’s findings2 8 . All the betrothals were celebrated in churches, including 
Or San Michele, Santa Trinita, San Pier Scheraggio, and Santa Maria sopra Porta, where the 
prenuptial negotiations satirized by Franco Sacchetti took place 2 9 . The betrothed, as their 
surnames (Bardi, Strozzi, Tornaquinci, Manelli, Del Caccia, and Guidetti) indicate, were members 
of upper-level families. Among the future bridegrooms we find the jurists Bartolomeo di Giovanni 
da Montegonzi and Francesco di Iacopo da Empoli3 0. Jurists, including Lorenzo Ridolfi, Stefano di 
Giovanni Buonaccorsi, and Pietro di Lionardo Beccanugi, appeared as witnesses3 1 . Curiously, none 
of the betrothal witnesses belonged to the clergy, who appear as witnesses in testaments and other 
transactions. 
On the other hand, our evidence somewhat differs from Cohn’s finding that the acts of betrothal, 
marriage, and dowry acknowledgment were separated by a few days and seldom by more than a 
month. His finding is more applicable to the occurrence of marriage contracts and confessiones 
dotium, which were frequently recorded on the same day in Florence and its contado3 2 , and less 
applicable to the interval between betrothals and marriages. For thirteen of the sixteen sponsalia  
contracts in our admittedly tiny sample, Giacomini recorded subsequent marriages. It is likely that 
the three remaining marriages were recorded by other notaries, or that conceivably the marriages 
did not occur owing to the death of a future spouse. Three betrothals and subsequent marriages 
occurred within one day3 3 , all the rest within a matter of months3 4 . The year-and-a-half lapse 
                                                 
25 Princes, it seems, had little compunction about breaking betrothal agreements on grounds of political expediency. 
See NICOLE CHAREYON, “De l’histoire à la chanson. Les fiançailles rompues de Louis de Male”, Moyen Age  103 (1997): 
545-559. 
26 S. K. COHN, Jr., The Laboring Classes in Renaissance Florence (New York and London 1980), pp. 19-23. 
27  S. SEIDEL MENCHI, “Percorsi obbligati. Elogio del matrimonio pre-tridentino”, in Matrimoni in dubbio. Unioni 
controverse e nozze clandestine in Italia dal XIV al XVIII secolo, S. Seidel Menchi and D. Quaglioni (edd) (Bologna 
2001), pp. 35ff; G. ZARRI, “Il matrimonio tridentino”, pp. 204ff. For the case of a law student who, while attending the 
university of Bologna, was married per verba de futuro  to his Palermitan bride (Violante Belingerio), see C. A. GARUFI, 
“Il matrimonio per verba de futuro  di un siciliano  studente leggi in Bologna nel 1349”, Il circolo giuridico  28 (1897): 
62-72, 161 -173, 200-204. The instrument was drafted in Palermo in 1349. 
28 ASF, NA, 9039. Alphabetical lists of the betrothal and marriage contracts are found at the beginning of the filza. 
29 See above, note 6. 
30 ASF, NA, 9039, fol. 33r, 430r. 
31  Ibid., fol. 69r, 430r. 
32 ASF, NA, 19768 (ser Taddeo Lapi), fol. 1v (27 Jan. 1353/4), fol. 3r (4 Feb. 1353/4), fol. 6rv (16 Feb. 1353/4), fol. 23r 
(20 Sept. 1353), fol. 30v (18 Jan. 1354/5), fol. 31 r (1 Feb. 1354/5). The same practice is found in Arezzo and Perugia. 
For Arezzo, see ASF, NA 1921 (ser Bartolomeo di Taviano), fol. 5v (31 Mar. 1392), fol. 8rv (28 Apr. 1392), fol. 22rv (8 
Jun. 1393), fols. 24v-25r (12 Oct. 1393), fols. 29v -30r (4 Mar. 1394/5), fol. 30rv (4 Mar. 1394/5), fols. 34r-35r (12 Aug. 
1394), fol. 40rv (3 June 1394). For Perugia, see Archivio di Stato, Perugia, notarile 49 (Niccolò di Lucolo), fol. 29rv (16 
May 1401), fols. 33v -34v (30 Jun. 1401), fol. 73r (23 Apr. 1403). 
33 The occurrence of betrothal and marriage on the same day was not so unusual as it may seem. For other examples, 
see Ricordanze  di Niccolò del Buono Busini (1400-1413), ASF, Carte Strozziane, ser. 4, n. 564, fol. 30v (22 Dec. 1404); 
Ricordanze  di Antonio di Leonardo Rustichi (1412-1436), Carte Strozziane, ser. 2, n. 11, fol. 13v (21 Jan. 1417); 
SUSANNAH KERR FOSTER, The Ties that Bid: Kinship Association and Marriage in the Alberti Family 1378-1428 (Ph.D. 
diss., Cornell University, 1985), p. 400. 
34 Interestingly, the short intervals in Florence are similar to the intervals separating betrothals and marriages in the 
early Roman Empire. See TREGGIARI, Roman Marriage, pp. 153-155. 
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between the betrothal and marriage of Agostina di Zanobi de’ Bardi to the banker Roberto di Buoni 
was unusually long and risky3 5 . In Florence and other Italian cities, especially during this plague-
infested period, the rush to marriage was prompted by fear that the longer the interval, the greater 
the possibility that the marriage, and therefore the family alliance, would not take place owing to 
the death of one of the sponsa or sponsus. But there were other good reasons for not waiting to 
contract marriage. Sponsi wanted the dowry promised them, which was customarily conveyed at 
the time marriage was contracted. To dampen suspicions invited by a long interval that the 
betrothed were behaving dishonorably, it was in everyone’s interest to conclude the marriage in 
measured haste. 
 
Breaking Betrothals 
Helmholz reminds us that canon law departed from Roman civil law by making a “contract by 
words of future consent ... specifically enforceable in church courts. Even where the espousals were 
entered into without the force of an oath, where the contract was a nudum pactum, the canon law 
granted an action to secure its enforcement”3 6 . The proof text authorizing compulsion was the 
canon Ex litteris Silvani (X 4.1.10), in which a breaching party, under threat of ecclesiastical 
censure3 7 , is compelled to fulfill the betrothal promise. If the breaching party disobeys the order to 
marry, he and his father are to be excommunicated, unless it can be shown that a legitimate cause 
exists impeding the marriage. Because of these conditions, we have deliberately avoided employing 
the terms “engagement”, “fiancé” and “fiancée”, and “fidanzamento”, which in recent and current 
usage lack the binding force carried by medieval sponsalia, sponsus, and sponsa3 8 . 
Determining whether a breach of contract was committed when marriage did not follow the 
betrothal was a matter for legal experts and church authorities. No breach of contract ensued, the 
canonists agreed, where the sponsa and sponsus voluntarily and mutually consented to withdraw 
from the betrothal with authorization from their bishop, or where a party proved that the betrothal 
promise was coerced3 9 , or where the death of a party made marriage an impossibility. A party’s 
subsequent serious physical or mental infirmity or entrance into a religious order also constituted 
legitimate reasons for dissolving the betrothal contract. Recall that after his conversion to 
Christianity, Augustine withdrew from the betrothal that his mother Monica had arranged on his 
behalf with a ten-year-old heiress4 0. In other cases, a marriage might become impossible when a 
party had not yet reached puberty on the agreed-upon date of marriage, when the parties were 
related to each other within prohibited degrees or when they came to be related by affinity, or 
                                                 
35 ASF, NA, 9039, fol. 97v, 250r. 
36 R. H. HELMHOLZ, Marriage Litigation in Medieval England  (Cambridge 1974), p. 35. On the enforceabilty of sworn 
promises to marry, see Innocent’s III decretal, Praeterea hi (X 4.1.2). According to SEIDEL, Jan Van Eyck’s Arnolfini 
Portrait , p. 70, betrothals in Ghent and Bruges “had the binding force of contracts”. Like so many historians, HALL, 
The Arnolfini Betrothal, p. 61, minimizes the binding force of sponsalia contracts by accenting the legal reasons for 
breaking them. This approach creates the misleading impression that sponsalia  are analogous to contemporary 
engagements to marry. 
37  Though compulsion may seem to be a flagrant violation of the principle of freedom of marriage, excommunication in 
this case was deemed legitimate because the parties made their promise under oath. 
38 As O. Di Simplicio points out, the expression sponsalia de futuro  “non é assimilabile alla parola fidanzamento , come 
essa viene intesa nel XX secolo”. Further, fidanzamento  and its cognates, fidanzato  and fidanzati, were not used in the 
Trecento and Quatrocento. See his Peccato, penitenza, perdono. Siena 1575-1800. La formazione della coscienza 
nell’Italia moderna (Milan 1994), p. 250. 
39 On the issue of parental consent and coercion, see C. F. O’DONNELL, The Marriage of Minors: An Historical 
Synopsis and Commentary  (Washington, D. C. 1945); M. TOCCI, “Il consensus parentum alle nozze nella canonistica e 
nel pensiero dei teologi tridentini. Un caso di obbligo de honestate?”, Archivio giuridico  120 (2000): 541 -580 ; M. 
KORPIOLA, “An Uneasy Harmony: Consummation and Parental Consent in Secular and Canon law in Medieval 
Scandinavia”, in Nordic Perspectives on Medieval Canon Law , M. Korpiola (ed) (Publications of Matthias Calonius 
Society, 2) (Saarijärvi, 1999), pp. 125-150; G. COZZI, “Padri, figli e matrimoni clandestini (metà secolo XVI - metà 
secolo XVIII)”, La Cultura  14 (1976): 169-213; D. HACKE,  “Non lo volevo per marito in modo alcuno . Matrimoni 
forzati e conflitti generazionali a Venezia fra il 1580 e il 1680”, in Tempi e spazi di vita femminile tra medioevo ed età 
moderna, S. Seidel Menchi, A. Jacobson Schutte, and T. Kuehn (edd) (Bologna 1999), pp. 195-224. 
40 GRUBBS , Law and Family in Late Antiquity, p. 155. 
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when one of the parties was already betrothed or married4 1 . A future marriage might be derailed if 
one of the parties was declared infamous or committed fornication with a third party, or if the 
future bridegroom was absent from the city for a protracted period - conventionally , two years4 2 . 
In theory, ecclesiastical courts, operating under the presumption matrimonium gaudet favore 
iuris, should have been inclined to grant the petition of the party seeking to enforce the betrothal 
contract. In practice, church courts were disinclined to compel an obdurate party to marry, which 
would have undermined the sacred principle that choosing a spouse must be ultimately grounded 
in consent given freely with a clear mind4 3 . Church courts in Paris and Regensburg allowed the 
dissolution of betrothals where one party repudiated the betrothal contract, but they ordered the 
breaching party to compensate the other party for expenses incurred in anticipation of marriage4 4 . 
The available published evidence suggests that adjudication of disputes in Italian church courts of 
the validity and performance of betrothal contracts occurred infrequently, at least before the 
Council of Trent4 5 . Only a handful of cases involving betrothal contracts were adjudicated before 
the diocesan courts in fifteenth-century Florence and Fiesole 4 6 . None of the litigants belonged to 
families of high social standing. 
In the middle of the fifteenth century, statutes enacted in Bologna, Carpi, Modena, and Piombino 
imposed penalties on parties contracting and breaking multiple betrothals4 7 . These statutes were 
aimed at the chronic problems caused by clandestine betrothals and marriages. Incensed that their 
children were betrothed and married without parental and family approval, parents and relatives 
pressured the sponsae and sponsi to break their promises, so that they could be married to people 
who had received the family’s approval. The statutes also refer to violent reprisals undertaken by 
                                                 
41  Parties who secretly married (per verba de presenti) a person other than the betrothed frequently appeared in the 
records of church courts. See LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, “Regle et réalité dans le droit matrimonial”, pp. 210-217; M. 
VLEESCHOUWERS -VAN MELEBEEK , “Aspects du lien matrimonial dans le Liber Sentenciarum de Bruxelles”, Revue 
d’histoire de droit 53 (1985): 50-61. 
42 For a list of cases in which the sponsalia could be dissolved, see IOHANNES ANDREAE, De sponsalibus et matrimoniis , 
in Tractatus universi iuris (Venice 1584), vol. 9, fol. 2rv. For the absence of the sponsus  for a protracted period, see l. 
Si is qui puellam (C. 5.1.2). 
43 A. LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD, “Ad matrimonium contrahere compellitur”, Revue de droit canonique 28 (1978): 210-217. 
44 L. POMMERAY, L’officialité archidiaconale de Paris et sa compétence criminelle aux XIVe et XVe siècle  (Paris 1933), 
pp. 346-348; R. WEIGAND,  “Zur mittelalterlichen kirchlichen Ehegerichtsbarkeit”, in Liebe und Ehe, pp. 312-313; C. 
CHRISTENSEN -NUGUES, “Mariage consenti et mariage contraint: l’abjuration sub pena nubendi à Officialité de Cerisy, 
1314-1346”, Médiévales: langues, textes, histoire  40 (2001): 101-111. The evidence on the frequency of disputes over 
the enforcement of betrothals in late medieval rural England is mixed: see M. INGRAM, “Spousal Litigation in the 
English Ecclesiastical Courts c. 1350-c. 1640”, in Marriage and Society. Studies in the Social History of Marriage, R. 
B. Outhwaite (ed) (New York 1981), pp. 41ff; C. DONAHUE, “Female Plaintiffs in Marriage Cases in the Court of York in 
the Later Middle Ages. What Can We Learn from the Numbers?” in Wife and Widow in Medieval England , S. 
SHERIDAN WALKER (ed) (Ann Arbor 1993), pp. 183-213. 
45 G. DOLEZALEK , Das Imbreviaturbuch des erzbischöflichen Gerichtsnotars Hubaldus aus Pisa: Mai bis August 1230 
(Cologne and Vienna 1969); MEEK, “Women”, pp. 82-85; ID., “Un’unione incerta: la vicenda di Neria, figlia 
dell’organista, e di Baldassino, merciaio pistoiese (Lucca 1396-1397)”, in Matrimoni in dubbio , pp. 107 -121. 
46 BRUCKER, “Ecclesiastical Courts in Fifteenth-Century Florence”, pp. 244-245; ID., Giovanni and Lusanna. Love and 
Marriage in Renaissance Florence  (Berkeley 1986), p. 129. For post-Tridentine Florence, see D. LOMBARDI, “Il 
matrimonio. Norme, giurisdizioni, conflitti nello stato fiorentino del Cinquecento”, in Istituzioni e società in Toscana 
nell’età moderna (Florence 1994), pp. 7 87-805; and her “Intervention by Church and State in Marriage Disputes in 
Sixteenth-and Seventeenth-Century Florence”, in Crime, Society and the Law in Renaissance Italy, T. Dean and K. J. 
P. Lowe (edd) (Cambridge 1994), pp. 142-156. On trials concerning breach of promise to marry adjudicated in the 
Archiepiscopal Court in pre-Tridentine Bologna (1544-1563), see L. FERRANTE, “Marriage and Women’s Subjectivity in 
a Patrilineal System: The Case of Early Modern Bologna”, in Gender, Kinship, Power: A Comparative and 
Interdisciplinary History , M. J. Maynes, et al. (edd) (New York and London, 1996), pp. 115-129, and the author’s “Gli 
sposi contesi. Una vicenda bolognese di metà Cinquecento”, in Matrimoni in dubbio , pp. 329-362. According to K. 
Stow, among Jews in the Roman Jewish ghetto “there were at least twenty-three broken engagements out of about 560 
matches registered by Jewish notaries during the fifty years 1536-85, or 4.1%”. See his “Marriages are Made in Heaven: 
Marriage and the Individual in the Roman Jewish Ghetto”, Renaissance Quarterly 48 (1995): 473. 
47  T. DEAN, “Fathers and Daughters: Marriage Laws and Marriage Disputes in Bologna and Italy, 1200-150”, in 
Marriage in Italy, 1300-1650, pp. 91-92; R. DEL GRATTA, Giovan Battista de Luca e gli statuti di Piombino  (Naples 
1985), p. 60, 259. 
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the jilted parties. As far as we know, Florentines who were victims of broken betrothal promises in 
the late Trecento and Quattrocento resorted to legal remedies rather than to violence4 8 . 
Long gone were the days when the Florentine knight Buondelmonte de’ Buondelmonti was 
murdered for breaking his solemn pledge to take as his wife an Amidei girl. Like many marriages 
among warring noble families in the early Duecento, Buondelmonte’s marriage had been arranged 
to keep peace between the two families. However, he was enticed by Forteguerra Donati’s wily 
widow to break his betrothal and marry instead her daughter, whose rare beauty captivated him. 
As an inducement, the widow promised that she would pay the penalty (pena) for Buondelmonte’s 
repudiation, which, as we know, did not quench the Amidei’s and their allies’ thirst for revenge. 
According to Florentine tradition, the dramatic murder of Buondelmonte at the foot of Ponte 
Vecchio beneath a statute of Mars in 1215 ignited the Guelph-Ghibelline conflict, which devastated 
the city for generations 4 9 . The lesson of Buondelmonte’s ill-fated betrayal was immortalized by 
Dante: “o Buondelmonte, quanto mal fuggisti / le nozze sue per li altrui conforti”. (Paradiso, XVI, 
140-141). 
In Florence, the name Buondelmonte became synonymous with a groom who could not be trusted 
to fulfill his betrothal contract. The lead character in Giovanni Sercambi’s satiric depiction of 
betrothal practices among noble Florentine families was purposefully given the name messer 
Renaldo de’ Buondelmonte. He wants to marry Ginevra, the daughter of messer Lanfranco 
Rucellai, and after the standard preliminaries, the two families come to an agreement on the 
betrothal and marriage. Lanfranco’s wife is delighted with her daughter’s betrothal to Renaldo but 
wants them to marry immediately, for she is alarmed that he will change his mind. Sercambi’s 
audience, familiar with the story of the nonfictional Buondelmonte, would have instantly 
appreciated the wife’s shrewdness. Relating her fears to her dull-witted husband, she urges him to 
find the notary who had come with Renaldo and who had prepared the sponsalitium, so that he 
can draw up the marriage contract. Lanfranco finds Renaldo who is agreeable to the wife’s plan. 
Soon afterward Renaldo arrives with his kinsmen and his notary at Lanfanco’s house. The couple 
then exchange present-tense vows and the bride is given a beautiful ring, all of which is attested by 
the notary in the contract of marriage5 0. Later, Renaldo, amid pomp and circumstance, introduces 
Ginevra into his household. 
 
Arrhae Sponsaliciae 
Breach of promise to marry in Roman law, unlike English common law, was not actionable. Under 
Codex 5.1.1, Alii desponsata, a sponsa was free to withdraw from her betrothal promise to one 
person and marry another. At the same time, Roman emperors and their jurists sought to deter 
breach of betrothal promises by requiring the sponsus or his family to put up arrhae sponsaliciae 
(earnest money), which became a standard feature of betrothal contracts in the late Roman 
Empire and of the notarized contracts in the Middle Ages. The standard Roman law model 
                                                 
48 The Florentine merchant Giovanni di Pagolo Morelli recounted in his ricordi that before he married Caterina 
d’Alberto Alberti in 1395, he originally wanted to marry another woman, and hoping to win her, he had forgone 
opportunities to marry into other prominent families. The woman’s father, whose name was not divulged, promised 
that he would marry his daughter to Morelli and the alliance was affirmed by the ritual handclasp in Santa Croce. But 
before the sponsalitium took place, the father withdrew his promise. Still feeling rage at having been deceived and 
betrayed (tradimento ), Morelli related that “I have seen, and I still see”, revenge (vendetta) inflicted on both the father 
and his family. Significantly, the inflicted revenge was metaphorical: the “grandissima grazia” (greatest blessing) of 
having married Caterina and his prosperous financial position were his “revenge”. See GIOVANNI DI PAGOLO MORELLI, 
Ricordi, V. Branca (ed) (Florence 1956), pp. 342-343. 
49 DINO COMPAGNI, Cronica, G. Luzzatto (ed) (Turin 1968), lib. I, cap. 2, pp. 7 -8; GIOVANNI V ILLANI, Nuova cronica, G. 
Porta (ed) (Parma 1990), vol. 1, lib. 6, cap. 38, pp. 267 -269; LEONARDO BRUNI, History of the Florentine People , vol. I, 
Books I-IV, J. Hankins (ed. and trans.) (Cambridge, Mass. and London), Book 2, pp. 106-107; NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, 
Florentine Histories, translated by L. F. Banfield and H. C. Mansfield, Jr. (Princeton, New Jersey 1988), pp. 55-56, lib. 
2, chap. 3. 
50 SERCAMBI, novella 8, p. 129: “La donna contentissima disse a messer Lanfranco che trovasse uno notaio che venga 
con messer Ranaldo acciò che il matrimonio si fermi, pensando che messer Renaldo non si pentisse”. 
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required the sponsus to consign the agreed-upon arrhae to the sponsa5 1 . If he breached the 
betrothal, the sponsa would simply retain the earnest money. In the event the sponsa was the 
breaching party, she or her family was obligated to indemnify the sponsus with double, or 
quadruple, the amount she received from the sponsus5 2 . The chief purpose of arrhae was to 
compel contractual performance by preventing a party from withdrawing from the betrothal 
contract with impunity. In contrast to the standard Roman law model, the Middle Ages saw the 
introduction of a consequential practice: the arrhae came to be simply promised, not given, by 
both parties. In the model betrothal contract included in the 1391 Florentine formulary of ser 
Iacopo Toschanelli (appendix 2), both parties affirm and acknowledge receipt of two hundred 
florins as arrhae, with the stipulation “that the violating and breaching party will give, pay and 
restore double this amount to the aggrieved party”. The clause for the reciprocal and simultaneous 
exchange of arrhae had been a standard feature of Florentine and Tuscan betrothal contracts since 
at least the middle of the thirteenth century5 3 . More importantly, it was a legal fiction, since 
obviously the parties did not exchange anything5 4 . 
In Florence, the fictional exchange of the same amount of arrhae seems, at first glance, illogical. 
Yet, upon closer inspection the via fictionis taken by our merchant families was, in fact, an 
effective way of managing risk. Florentine merchant families - fearing loss of arrhae, no matter 
which party defaulted - were wary and often incapable of transferring large sums to another party. 
Nor was it feasible for them, even if they had the cash on hand, to tie up large amounts of capital 
that were indispensable for business undertakings. Just as the size of the dowry increased in the 
fifteenth century5 5 , so did the amount of arrhae that was required to secure the performance of 
betrothals contracted by the wealthy and prominent. We were able to match sponsalia and dowry 
contracts of eight couples in the register of Francesco di Piero Giacomini cited above. In four cases, 
the amount of arrhae slightly exceeded the amount of the dowry , in three cases the amount was 
slightly lower, and in one case the amount was identical. By way of illustration, in a betrothal 
contracted between the Lipacci and Alessandri, the amount was 1,500 florins, while the 
corresponding dowry was 1,600 florins 5 6 . In the betrothal contracted between the Carocci and the 
                                                 
51  Needless to say, the father of the sponsus also could give the arrhae  on behalf of his son. Though Roman legislation 
considered various possibilities - for instance, whether the sponsa was sui iuris and whether she had reached puberty  - 
for our purpose, part of this legislation is irrelevant, for, especially in the Middle Ages, it was the parents of the 
sponsus or sponasa who gave or promised the arrhae. 
52 On Roman arrhae sponsaliciae, see C. 5.1.5, Mulier iuris sui; ANNE, Les rites des fiançailles, pp. 122-125, 425-426; 
GRUBBS , Law and Family, pp. 163-164; 174-182. See also R. ZIMMERMANN, The Law of Obligations. Roman 
Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (Deventer and Boston 1990), pp. 230-234. 
53 Un formulario notarile fiorentino della metà del dugento, S. P. P. Scalfati (ed) (Florence 1997), pp. 83-84: “De 
promissione et iuramento dandi aliquam in futurum in sponsam uxorem sub arris sponsalitiis”. For later examples, 
see I notai fiorentini dell’età di Dante: Biagio Boccadibue (1298-1314), vol. 1, fasc. 3 (novembre 1305-maggio 1309) 
(Florence 1984), pp. 1-2 (doc. 480); pp. 49-50 (doc. 531); p. 62 (doc. 545); p. 63 (doc. 546); p. 125 (609); pp. 132-133 
(doc. 618). In Pisa and its contado  the breaching party was required to pay double the arrhae and all litigation 
expenses. The injured party was also authorized to have the breacher’s property seized in satisfaction of the claim. See 
the sponsalia contracts in ASF, NA (ser Meo Buonfigliolo), fol. 3rv (20 Jun. 1401/2); fol. 5rv (2 Jun. 1402), fols. 25v-
26v (8 Nov. 1403); fol. 28v (9 Nov. 1403), fols. 35r-36r (26 April 1404). For Siena, see a consilium of the Perugian 
jurist, Onofrio Bartolini, on a dispute over the nonperformance of a betrothal contract that occurred in Siena around 
1408. Its punctus refers to the mutual exchange of one thousand florins of arrhae  money, which was acknowledged by 
the parties in the sponsalia contract. See BNF, Magliabechiano XXIX, Cl. 165, fols. 39v -41r, 39v: “Insuper dictus Deus 
[the father of the sponsa] ex una parte et dictus Antonius [the sponsus] ex alia, videlicet una pars ab alia et econtra, 
confessi fuerunt habuisse et recepisse et eis datum et numeratum fuisse et cetera nomine arrarum sponsalitiarum 
florenos auri mille”. The party failing to observe the terms of the contract was obligated “redere duplichatus” that 
amount to the aggrieved party. 
54 Since the acknowledgment of arrhae  was a fictitious transaction, we have chosen not to translate arrhae in this 
context as “earnest money ” for this last term conveys the idea of an actual cash transfer from one party to the other. 
55 L. MARTINES , The Social World of the Florentine Humanists, 1390-1460  (Princeton, New Jersey 1963), pp. 37 -39; 
MOLHO, Marriage Alliance, pp. 324ff; L. FABBRI, Alleanza matrimoniale e patriziato nella Firenze del ‘400. Studio 
sulla famiglia Strozzi (Florence 1991), pp. 71ff.  
56 ASF, NA, 9039, fol. 255rv (17 Feb. 1419/20), fol. 395rv (22 Nov.1421). The observation that arrhae  and dowry 
tended to be roughly equivalent has been made by Hughes in connection with the Zaccaria family of Genoa between 
1271 and 1282. It is not clear from Hughes’s incomplete description whether the stipulation of arrhae  was mutually 
binding and whether it was fictional or involved a real transfer of cash. See D. O. HUGHES, “Il matrimonio nell’Italia 
 11 
Barucci, the amount was 800 hundred florins; the corresponding dowry 720 florins 5 7 . In a late-
fifteenth-century Florentine formulary, the exemplar arrhae were set at 1,000 florins5 8 . 
To more fully appreciate the doctrinal context in which Angelus de Ubaldis rendered his two 
consilia , it is necessary to complement our brief account of arrhae sponsaliciae in Florence with a 
summary of the debate that erupted in the Middle Ages over the validity of attaching penalties to 
sponsalia contracts. From their Middle Eastern or Semitic origins to their incorporation into 
Justinian’s Corpus iuris civilis, arrhae sponsaliciae have attracted considerable attention from 
historians of ancient and Roman law. Koschaker, Cornil, Volterra, Brandileone, and Astolfi have 
focused on the reception of arrhae by Roman society, the efforts of legislators to include them in 
the system of Roman law, and the subsequent legislative developments, including the legislation of 
the Eastern Empire5 9 . Anné produced a nuanced study of their origins and diffusion, first in the 
eastern and then in the western part of the empire, and of the influence of Christianity on them6 0. 
In contrast to this profuse attention, arrhae under the ius commune remain a largely uncharted 
territory. 
For the Middle Ages we focus on a few broad issues gravitating around both doctrine and practice. 
From a theoretical point of view, one of the first issues jurists had to face was that of determining 
the differences between arrhae and a penalty. Next, especially in view of canon law, came the 
problem of the compatibility of arrhae with the sacred principle that marriage should be based on 
the free will and consent of the contracting parties. The custom of promising and acknowledging 
the fictitious receipt of substantial arrhae made the jurists examine not only whether the promise 
and acknowledgment of arrhae were legally valid, but also whether the amount should be limited 
to a token whose loss would be financially negligible. If, instead of a cash transfer, the arrhae 
consisted of a pledge (pignus), how should the pledge be construed in view of the imperial 
legislation on arrhae? With regard to the so-called Romano-canonical procedure, jurists had to 
face the question of what action could be granted to the aggrieved party when the sponsalia were 
unilaterally broken. 
The chief piece of legislation regulating the system of arrhae was l. Mulier (C. 5.1.5) - a 
constitution originally promulgated by Emperor Leo in 472 and then inserted in the Codex6 1 . 
Classic Roman law recognized that the stipulation of a penalty for the party who unilaterally 
withdraws from the sponsalia violates the customary principle of free marriage. While endorsing 
this principle, l. Mulier permitted arrhae and regulated their restitution6 2 . Since both arrhae and 
a penal stipulation violate the principle of freedom of marriage, a coherent piece of legislation 
                                                                                                                                                                                
medievale”, in Storia del matrimonio , M. De Giorgio and C. Klapisch-Zuber (edd) (Bari 1996), pp. 26-27. For the 
rough equivalence between dowry and arrhae, see The Society of Renaissance Florence: A Documentary History , G. 
Brucker (ed) (New York 1971), pp. 32-37, especially 36. In a marriage negotiation involving the Del Bene family, 
Lemmo Balducci, whose daughter was betrothed to Amerigo Del Bene, objected to setting the penalty for breaking the 
sponsalia  at 2,000 florins. Among other reasons, the bride’s father alleged that a penalty of 2,000 florins would spread 
the rumor that he had given a corresponding dowry (“ogni persona spererà ch’io dia di dota fiorini IIM d’oro”). For the 
transcription of the original documents, see GENE A. BRUCKER, Firenze nel Rinascimento , translated by M. R. Bertelli 
(Florence 1980), pp. 253-257, for the citation, p. 256. For another example of the parity between arrhae  and dowry, 
see the  consilium of the fourteenth-century consultor, Andreas de Monte Ubbiano (=Monte Vibiano, a castello  on a 
hilltop south of Perugia). Here, Corrado, father of the sponsa, promises to pay the  sponsus a dowry worth 300 florins 
upon consummation of the marriage. In addition, Corrado acknowledges receipt of 300 florins in arrhae  from the 
guardians of the sponsus , and in turn promises to pay the sponsus 600 florins (reddere duplicitas) if and when the 
sponsa does not fulfill the terms of the betrothal contract. The jurist determined that the guardians had not actually 
paid the  arrhae  (numeratio non probatur) and therefore had no claim against the sponsa. The consilium is located in 
the Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria of Torino, Cod. H. I. 13, fol. 73rv. 
57  ASF, NA, 9039, fol. 201r (30 May 1419), fols. 239v -240r (22 Dec.1419). 
58 Formularium diversorum contractuum printed at Venice in 1506, fols. 49v -50r (instrumentum sponsalitii). 
59 P. KOSCHAKER, “Zur Geschichte der arrha sponsalicia”, ZRG, Rom. Abt. 33 (1912): 383-416; E. VOLTERRA, “Studio 
sull’arrha sponsalicia”, Rivista italiana per le scienze giuridiche, n.s., t. 2 (1927): 581 -615; n.s., t. 4 (1929): 3-33; n.s, t. 
5 (1930): 155-245; ID., s.v. “Sponsalia”, Nuovissimo digesto italiano  (Turin 1971), vol. 18, pp. 34-37; G. CORNIL, “Die 
arrha im justinianischen Recht”, ZRG, Rom. Abt. 48 (1928): 51-87 ; ASTOLFI, Il fidanzamento , pp. 181 -208. 
60 ANNE, Les rites des fiançailles, pp. 87 -135. 
61  On the content of this fragment, see ASTOLFI, Il fidanzamento , pp. 190-1 9 7 . 
62 For the arrhae  in the early Middle Ages, especially in Germanic law, see P. L. REYNOLDS , Marriage in the Western 
Church (Leiden, New York, and Köln 1994), pp. 67 -100, 113-114. 
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would require the prohibition of both6 3 . The inconsistent treatment to which arrhae and a penalty 
were subjected by imperial legislation became a conundrum for civil and canon lawyers in the 
Middle Ages. 
In c. Gemma (X 4.1.29), the locus classicus for discussing arrhae, Pope Gregory IX reiterated the 
principle of freedom of marriage and prohibited forcing an unwilling partner into marriage by the 
threat of a penal stipulation. In his decretal, the pope prohibited the future groom’s father from 
extorting (extorsio)6 4  an agreed-upon penalty from the future bride’s mother (Gemma) on grounds 
that the marriage had not been contracted after the sponsalia had been made. The case and the 
papal response are patterned after l. Titia (D. 45.1.134). According to this fragment, where either 
spouse refuses marriage, a penal stipulation attached to the betrothal contract is invalidated, 
because the penalty runs counter to the commonly accepted standards of a community (boni 
mores) requiring that marriages, present and future, not be secured by the threat of a penalty6 5 . 
The text of the decretal has nothing specific to say on arrhae, and sponsalia are mentioned as a 
fait accompli. Note that, even without papal intervention, a reason existed for invalidating the suit, 
as both the sponsus and sponsa had not yet reached the minimum legal age of seven years for 
contracting lawful sponsalia6 6 . 
While the pope looked ahead to marriage, Bernardus of Parma in his gloss to c. Gemma looked 
back to sponsalia, asking whether or not arrhae are compatible with the principle of freedom of 
marriage. Torn between a theological principle and an institution sanctioned by Roman law, and 
compelled to take into account the custom of giving arrhae, his gloss is a conceptual jumble and 
amounts to little more than a convenient repository of opinions that could be useful to canonists6 7 . 
“Attaching a penal stipulation to sponsalia”, he wrote, “makes that stipulation invalid for the 
reason given in the text”. Shifting to a series of Roman law texts, he went on, “arrhae given at 
sponsalia are lost, if the giving party  withdraws without producing a just reason”. “Since the 
reason 6 8  for giving the arrhae and establishing a penalty is the same”, he observed without 
supplying the reason for treating them in the same fashion, “both should be subjected to the same 
prohibition”. The two laws, civil and canon, were on a collision course. In an attempt to avoid the 
conflict, Bernardus sought another reading of arrhae: they may be understood as an incentive (res 
favorabilis) to marriage; penalties were not. Worse, penalties were hateful6 9 . 
How Bernardus worked was immaterial; it mattered how he was understood. For civilian jurists, 
including Angelus de Ubaldis, the glossator, by treating arrhae as if they were a penalty, had 
                                                 
63 The prohibition of penalties should not be taken to mean that they  were not attached de facto to betrothal contracts. 
At the end of the ninth century, Emperor Leo the Philosopher recognized the lawfulness of inserting a penal 
stipulation in a marriage contract. On his legislation on sponsalia, see G. FERRARI, “Diritto matrimoniale secondo le 
Novelle di Leone il filosofo”, Byzantinische Zeitschrift , 18 (1909): 159-1 7 5 . 
64 The term extorsio  aptly conveys the strong condemnation of the practice of exacting a penalty from the party in 
default. In 1517, the Florentine Synod reiterated the prohibition to attach any penalty to marriages and, in the same 
context, the bishops forbade people from acknowledging and promising arrhae . Moreover, in order that everybody 
would fully understand the content of the norms, the decrees related to marriage and sponsalia were published in 
vernacular. For the text, see MANSI, vol. 35, col. 252, Cap. IX: “Et il medesimo dichiarò haver luogo nelle arre promesse 
o confessate in fraude di detta pena”.  
65  D. 1.45.134: “Ex stipulatione, quae proponeretur, cum non secundum bonos mores interposita sit, agenti 
exceptionem doli mali obstaturam, quia inhonestum visum est vinculo poenae matrimonia obstringi sive futura sive 
iam contracta”. 
66 See, for instance, HOSTIENSIS  to c. Gemma (X 4.1.29), (Venice 1581), fol. 9r, n. 1. For this canonist, the major issue 
(principale ) is the sponsalia, which were invalid because of the age of the two partners, and the accessorium  is the 
penal stipulation, which violated the principle of freedom of marriage. If the main element is invalid, then a subsidiary 
one - the penal stipulation is all the more so. Though medieval canonists gave various reasons for invalidating the 
penal stipulation, they concurred that the pope grounded his decision in the sacred principle of freedom of marriage 
and suggested that in this case age was not a contentious issue. 
67  Later canonists, for instance, Iohannes Andreae and Abbas Panormitanus, attempted to defend Bernardus’s method, 
saying that he did not intend to give a solution (resolvere ) to the case, but only to present the legal arguments 
(allegare) that jurists may use in such a case. 
68 For the principle “ubi eadem ratio ibi idem ius” that Bernardus applied to a penal stipulation and arrhae , see E. 
CORTESE, La norma giuridica. Spunti teorici nel diritto comune classico (Milan 1962), vol. 1, pp. 297 -338. 
69 Gloss Stipulatio  to c. Gemma (X 4.1.29), (Venice 1572), col. 849. 
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misunderstood their distinctive character. Jurists loudly lamented his misunderstanding7 0 , and 
canonists, too, reprimanded the glossator7 1 . For civilian jurists, an unexpected helping hand came 
from Sinibaldo Fieschi, later Pope Innocent IV. In his commentary to c. Gemma, Innocent turned 
out to be more Romanist than the Romanists. Although he addressed the delicate theological issue 
of freedom of marriage, he disregarded the Glossa, piling up citations of Roman law without a 
single reference to canon law7 2 . On grounds of l. Titia penalties are forbidden but arrhae are 
permitted. On grounds of l. Mulier, the party who gives the arrhae loses them if, because of the 
party’s fault, the marriage is not contracted, while the party who receives them must return double 
or fourfold if likewise the marriage is not contracted. On grounds of l. Si quis 7 3 , if a pledge (pignus) 
is given, it should be treated like arrhae. On grounds of l. Si is qui and l. Saepe7 4 , if within two 
years after the sponsalia marriage is not contracted, the dispositions on arrhae 7 5  become 
ineffective and the sponsa is free to marry another. Similarly, on grounds of l. Arrhis7 6 , if marriage 
is prevented by the death of one of the parties, the dispositions on arrhae are inapplicable. On 
grounds of § Hoc quoque and § Sin vero7 7 , the same applies if there is a lawful impediment to 
marriage7 8 . It is no wonder that Bartolus counted Innocent IV among the nostri (civilian jurists) 
who recognized that a cardinal difference existed between arrhae and a penalty7 9 . 
The equation Bernardus of Parma made between a penalty and arrhae, coupled with the canonists’ 
suspicion of arrhae as a possible peril to the freedom of marriage, prompted both civil and canon 
lawyers to dwell on the difference between giving arrhae and promis ing to pay a penalty. Their 
task was not easy and, as Petrus de Bellapertica aptly noted, “jurists have their hands full” in 
searching for a convincing difference 8 0 . For Odofredus, the difference was plain: arrhae 
constituted a cash payment, distinguished from a penalty, which constitutes a promise to pay. 
When one promises to pay a penalty if the marriage is not contracted, the promisor has not drawn 
anything from his purse (non extrahit aliquid de marsupio). As Odofredus quipped, human beings 
are generous when handing out mere words. In a worst-case scenario, one would take a blind wife 
rather than pay the thousand pounds he promised on breach of contract, which was tantamount to 
forcing the promisor into a marriage he would not have otherwise contracted. Moreover, since in 
                                                 
7 0 ODOFREDUS to l. Alii desponsata (C. 5.1.1 ), (Lyon 1550), fol. 262v, n. 3: “Sed canoniste per suum textum dicunt et 
glossant ... quod idem est in arris quod in pena, quia sicut debent esse libera matrimonia a vinculis penarum, sic etiam 
et arrarum, quia non videmus differentiam inter penam et arram”. CYNUS to l. Mulier (C. 5.1.5), (Frankfurt am Main 
1578), fol. 287v, n. 15: “Dicunt canoniste quod nulla reperitur ratio diversitatis, et ideo dicunt, idem iuris in arris quod 
est in pena, et ideo non servant istam legem... Sed ipsi non intelligunt nos”. BALDUS to l. Titia (D. 45.1.134), (Lyon 
1498), fol. 56r, n. 4: “Bernardus ... videtur dicere quod nulla est diversitas. Ideo idem ius, secundum canones, licet 
secus secundum leges”. ANGELUS DE UBALDIS  to l. Mulier (Venice, 1579), fol. 109r, n. 6: “Canoniste tamen in cap. 
Gemma, ... dicunt quod non est differentia inter arram et penam”. 
7 1  HOSTIENSIS  to c. Gemma (X 4.1.29), fol. 9r, and ARCHIDIACONUS (Guidus de Baisio) to c. Ubi (C.30 q.2 c.1), (Venice 
1601), fol. 436r. That Hostiensis’s note - namely , his note that no decretals or canon prevents the aggrieved party from 
asking for the return of the arrhae - was a reprimand of the glossa is asserted by Iohannes Andreae; see his 
commentary to c. Gemma  (Venice 1581), fol. 13v, n. 7: “et sic esset reprehensio ”. For a defense of Bernardus’s position, 
see ANTONIUS DE BUTRIO  to c. Gemma (Venice 1578), fol. 13r, n. 6. 
7 2 The dense construction of Innocent’s commentary to c. Gemma poses several questions to which we cannot give 
satisfactory answers. Was his silence on the gloss a disavowal of Bernardus’s position? Or, was he working with a 
repertorium from which he abstracted only the relevant sections on Roman law? Or did he think that arrhae pertained 
to civil law and were therefore of no concern to the canonists? 
7 3 C. 5.2.1. The printed text has “C. de re. pig., l. i”. - a scribal error for C. si rector provinciae vel ad eum pertinentes 
sponsalia dederint (C. 5.2). Hostiensis had doubts about the correctness of the allegation (C. de remissione pignorum) 
and indicated “de dona. inter vir. et uxo”. as a more pertinent citation, see HOSTIENSIS  to c. Gemma  (X 4.1.29), fol. 9r, 
n. 1. 
7 4 C. 5.1.2; D. 23.1.17. 
7 5 Note that the text of the printed edition uses the expression pena arrarum. 
7 6 C. 5.1.3. The edition has ff, de sponsa[libus], [l.] arre, which is inappropriate. 
7 7  C. 5.1.5.3-4. 
7 8 INNOCENTIUS IV to c. Gemma (Frankfurt am Main 1570), fol. 466rv. 
7 9 BARTOLUS  to l. Titia (Venice 1516), vol. VI, fol. 56r: “Ego autem ab opinione gl. nostrarum et Inno. non recedo, 
scilicet quod est differentia inter penam et arras”. 
80 PETRUS DE BELLAPERTICA  to l. Titia (D. 45.1.134), (Frankfurt am Main 1571), fol. 353r, n. 4: “Doctores satagunt 
rationem reddere”. 
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the case of arrhae only a small amount of money is disbursed to a mutual friend of the parties, it is 
unlikely that one would unwillingly contract marriage out of fear of losing it8 1 . 
Iacopus de Arena also distinguished between a penalty that obligates one to give something, which 
is permitted, and a penalty that is merely stipulated, which is invalid. The reason behind the 
distinction is that “it is easier to make a promise [to pay] than to make an actual cash payment”8 2 . 
Petrus de Bellapertica concurred and thought that the stipulation of magnae arrhae was invalid. 
Yet he allowed a significant exception to l. Titia . Instead of giving arrhae, kings may promise a 
substantial penalty, for the fear of a loss would not force these potentates into marriage8 3 . In 
general, jurists recognized the essential difference between a stipulation consisting of words and a 
cash payment (facto bursali)8 4 . Arguments about the validity of small amounts of arrhae were not 
entirely convincing, since any amount paid in case of withdrawal from the betrothal contract is 
after all the functional equivalent of a penalty. That civil and canon lawyers referred to arrhae as a 
“penalty” is an indication they realized that both were an obstacle to freedom of marriage. 
Canonists likewise found nothing in the body of decretals and canon law forbidding an aggrieved 
party  from asking the counterpart to return double or fourfold the amount of arrhae 85 . In 
particular, for Hostiensis arrhae were tacitly allowed, a penalty explicitly forbidden. The reason to 
treat arrhae and a penalty differently was that arrhae are actually conveyed and upon conveyance 
one may make an agreement that the receiving party may retain them if marriage is celebrated8 6 . 
But in a penal stipulation nothing is conveyed and, since there is no conveyance, no agreement 
may be made as to the penalty’s disposition. Accordingly, in the case of a penalty, if marriage is 
contracted, there is no gain (lucrum) or hope of retaining something. If marriage is not contracted, 
there is the fear of having to restore the agreed-upon sum or the pledge to the aggrieved party. The 
arrhae serve as an amicable incentive to contract marriage; the penalty induces fear, which 
abolishes free consent (liber consensus). In a doubtful case, he held that the hope of a gain rather 
than the fear of a loss was the reason prompting the parties to enter into marriage. Yet Hostiensis 
thought that not only giving but also asking for the restitution of the arrhae was favorable 
(favorabilis) to marriage 8 7 . His ingenuous explanation works only if marriage follows the 
sponsalia, for then the law presumes that the parties are induced to contract marriage by the hope 
of a gain. 
Hostiensis’s construction pleased neither Iohannes Andreae nor Antonius de Butrio. The fear of 
losing arrhae and the onerous restitution of double or fourfold the amount were obviously a 
penalty and an impediment to a free marriage. “I have seen”, Andreae wrote, “arrhae of four 
thousand pounds”. His solution, therefore, was to cut short legal speculation and fix arrhae to the 
social status of the persons contracting sponsalia (qualitas personarum). “Who doubts”, he asked, 
“that it is an impediment to marriage if a poor person gives big arrhae”. Since “gives” meant 
“promises”, Andreae alleged that such a promise was invalid. Conversely , wealthy persons or 
magnates may stipulate a small penalty, for the loss would be negligible. Though the canonists 
                                                 
81 ODOFREDUS to l. Alii desponsata (C. 5.1.1), 262v; and to l. Titia (D. 45.1.134), fol. 136v, n. 3. See also CYNUS to l. 
Mulier, fol. 207v, n. 15. 
82 IACOPUS DE ARENA to l. Mulier (C. 5.1.5), (Lyon 1541), fol. 32r. Iacopus’s commentary is followed by an addition 
attributed to Oldradus [de Ponte]. The addition is significant, for it lists a series of further differences between arrhae 
and penalty. 
83 PETRUS DE BELLAPERTICA  to l. Titia (D. 45.1.134), fol. 353r, n. 4. The ramifications of this exception can be seen in 
Cynus de Pistorio and, more explicitly, in Iohannes Andreae, for whom the arrhae  and their amount were set in 
accordance with the social status of a person. 
84 The colorful expression “facto bursali” comes from Odofredus. On the difference, see also ALBERICUS DE ROSATE to l. 
Titia (D. 45.1.134), (Venice 1585), fol. 94r, nn. 4-6. 
85 For other canonists who accepted that a difference existed between arrhae  and a penalty, see GULIELMUS DURANDIS, 
Speculum iudiciale  (Basel 1574), vol. 2, p. 440, lib. III, part. IV, De sponsalibus et matrimoniis, § Primo, n. 4; 
GOFFREDUS DE TRANI, Summa super titulis Decretalium (Lyon 1517), fol. 170v, De sponsalibus, n. 1; ANTONIUS DE 
BUTRIO  to c. Gemma, fol. 13r, n. 7. 
86 For the principle that, with respect to delivery, whatever has been agreed upon is undoubtedly valid, see l. In 
traditionibus (D. 2.14.48). 
87  HOSTIENSIS  to c. Gemma (X 4.1.29), fol. 9r, n. 2. 
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attributed this opinion to an unidentifiable8 8  group of jurists (dicunt quidam), Andreae endorsed it 
on grounds that l. Mulier was based on frequently occurring cases and applied to ordinary 
circumstances; kings, nobles, and very rich people may be treated differently and allowed to 
stipulate a small penalty if a party broke the betrothal contract8 9 . Abbas Panormitanus, too, 
approved of the two criteria (status and amount) proposed by Iohannes Andreae9 0. Canonists were 
willing to gloss over the prohibition of inserting any penalty, for they thought that a small penalty 
would not force a person with means into an unwanted marriage. The rationale of the law (ratio 
legis) was to safeguard the freedom of marriage; its literal interpretation (verba legis) was the 
prohibition of attaching a penal stipulation to a betrothal contract. For them, the ratio was 
preferable to the verba. 
In the end, neither civil nor canon lawyers succeeded in producing a persuasive analytical 
distinction between arrhae and a penalty. Toward the end of the fifteenth century the Milanese 
jurist Jason del Maino neatly summarized the impasse. He found that jurists had devised five basic 
reasons but, on close inspection, none of them was convincing9 1 . The Florentine jurist Pietro 
Aldobrandini echoed him: “there is a big dispute among doctors on the differences ... and none of 
them is conclusive, if they can persuade at all”9 2 . In short, jurists elaborated a distinction without 
difference, and that distinction could be supported only by persuasive, not convincing, reasons 9 3 . 
Despite the impasse, we can neither deny the jurists’ efforts to establish a real difference nor 
accuse them of being mere nominalists. Roman law had bequeathed them an inconsistent set of 
norms and they had to make the best of it. 
Jurists required actual conveyance (traditio corporalis) of arrhae. The wording of l. Mulier made 
clear that the mere acknowledgment (confessio) was insufficient to ground a future claim. The 
expression “received” (accepit), which recurred several times in the fragment, meant that a thing 
had been actually conveyed to the other party. The term “to receive” was understood to signify 
reality (veritas) not fiction9 4 . The standard formula regularly  used in betrothal contracts, “I 
promise you that I will ensure that A will take B as his wife and, if I do not so, I promise one 
hundred as arrhae, which I acknowledge that I have received”, was plainly invalid, for this was a 
promise to pay a penalty, and arrhae had to be actually transferred. Reciprocal acknowledgment of 
arrhae between sponsus and sponsa was also invalid, Bartolus de Sassoferrato declared, for one 
acknowledgment caused the other and no actual payment occurred 9 5 . Yet a unilateral 
acknowledgment of arrhae was considered valid and sufficient, unless fraud was proved, on 
grounds that any confessio is prejudicial to the person who makes it but not to a third party9 6 . 
                                                 
88 Probably Cynus de Pistorio. Antonius de Butrio and Niccolò dei Tedeschi, when reporting Iohannes Andreae’s 
argument, cited Cynus, too. 
89 IOHANNES ANDREAE to c. Gemma , fol. 13v, n. 9. Iohannes’s suggestion presupposes the knowledge of the exemption 
Petrus de Bellapertica granted to kings - that is, upon contracting marriage they may promise a big penalty instead of 
arrhae. 
90 ABBAS PANORMITANUS to c. Gemma (X 4.1.29) (Venice 1591), fol. 12, n. 8: “Multum mihi placet opini[onem] Io. An., 
ut consideretur qualitas et quantitas personarum, maxime respectu recipientis”. 
91  JASON DE MAINO to l. Titia (D. 45.1.134), (Turin 1573), fols. 186v-189v: “nulla concludens ratio diversitatis sed 
tantum persuasiva potest assignari”, citation at fol. 197v, n. 22. 
92 Petrus Aldobrandini in a marginal addition to ROLANDINUS, Summa totius artis notarie  (Venice 1546), fol. 81v. 
93 On the difference between “persuading” and “convincing”, see CH. PERELMAN and L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, The New 
Rhetoric. A Treatise on Argumentation, translated by J. Wilkinson and P. Weaver (Notre Dame and London 1969), pp. 
26-31. 
94 BALDUS  to l. Mulier (C. 5.1.5), s.f.: “Et primo circa arras [quero] utrum requiratur vera traditio? Et dicunt doctores 
quod sic, ut patet hic in litera in verbo ‘accepit,’ quod verbum est repetitum in multis partibus huius legis. Nam hoc 
veritatem significat”.  
95 BARTOLUS  to l. Titia (D. 45.1.134), vol. 6, fol. 56r; and, for a consilium in which he reiterated the same position, see 
Consilia, vol. 9, fol. 15r, cons. 45. The case involved the daughter of a prominent family, the Petrucci (probably of 
Siena). In presenting Bartolus’s doctrine, Niccolò dei Tedeschi noted “et maxime hoc procedit hodiernis temporibus, 
in quibus contrahentes confitentur recepisse alter ab altero magnam quantitatem arrharum, que in veritate nunquam 
fuerunt numerate, sed est nuda et simplex confessio”, see ABBAS PANORMITANUS to c. Gemma, fol. 12r, n. 8. 
96 For a discerning analysis of the issues involved in a unilateral acknowledgment of arrhae, see JASON DE MAINO to l. 
Titia (D. 45.1.134), fol. 188v, n. 26-2 7 . 
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Moreover, the reciprocal acknowledgment of any actual cash payment (numerata pecunia) made 
between the parties contracting sponsalia was considered a fraud9 7 . 
For Baldus de Ubaldis, in a doubtful situation, the reciprocal acknowledgment was valid only if the 
parties renounced their right to raise an exceptio non numerate pecunie - that is, in court they 
would not object that the payment was not made9 8 . Angelus de Ubaldis found an additional reason 
to distrust the reciprocal acknowledgment: the confessio occurred between two parties who by law 
are barred from making such a declaration9 9 . In one of his opinions , Honofrius de Bartolinis of 
Perugia maintained that since the fictional exchange of arrhae was invalid, the aggrieved party had 
no basis for suing the breaching party1 0 0 . Paulus de Castro granted that cases where both parties 
make a reciprocal acknowledgment of arrhae occurred daily, but the legal presumption was that 
the transaction was fraudulent, even if cash was actually transferred from one party to the other. 
That presumption that fraud existed was the advice he gave in one of his consilia. “To any persons 
endowed with discernment”, he asserted, “it should occur that this [meaning Bartolus’s view] is the 
sounder view”1 0 1 . Canonists, too, sided with Bartolus. Abbas Panormitanus wrote that “On this 
matter, I have seen consilia against Bartolus, but I did not endorse them, for, then and now, I 
believe that his opinion is truer”1 0 2 . 
The intricacies of a reciprocal acknowledgment of arrhae transferred figments of the court debate 
into the classroom. Suppose, Baldus told his students, “the sponsa acknowledges a hundred as 
arrhae and the sponsus does the same”. “You answer”, he went on, “that obviously nothing has 
been received”1 0 3 . But for the jurist things were not as they appeared at first sight. “If I give you a 
hundred as a loan”, he argued, “and you give me a hundred as a loan, there are undoubtedly two 
loans. Here we have two contracts and two causes”1 0 4 . It was like the case of a donation made in 
anticipation of future marriage (donatio propter nuptias) and the dowry. Though according to ius 
commune the amount of both must be the same they may not be confused1 0 5 . Again, Baldus asked, 
“suppose that two parties reciprocally acknowledge that they have received a hundred for the 
sponsalia and then one party withdraws. What is the effect of this transaction”? For the jurist, the 
party in default may be summoned on grounds of having given arrhae but not on their 
acknowledgment. Once in court, the defendant argues, “I compensate you by losing the hundred I 
gave, as it appears from the acknowledgment”. The other party replies, “You lost those hundred 
because you withdrew from the sponsalia. And you deserve a double penalty. Because of the 
reciprocal giving of the arrhae, you lose what you gave and must return double of what you 
received”. Baldus called attention to this case, for questions of this kind were raised time and 
again1 0 6 . The “reply ” of the aggrieved party shows how risky the reciprocal acknowledgment of 
arrhae in cash was. The question whether or not a double penalty - that is, the loss of the given 
                                                 
97  BARTOLUS  to l. Titia  (D. 45.1.134), vol. 6, fol. 56r: “Quid si in veritate ego numeravi tibi pecuniam nomine arrarum, 
et mihi eandem vel aliam eiusdem quantitatis? Respondeo: fraus est, et data non videntur”. 
98 BALDUS  to l. Mulier (C. 5.1.5), s.f.: “Nam in dubio standum est confessioni si est renunciatum exceptioni non 
numerate pecunie”. 
99 ANGELUS to l. Titia (D. 45.1.134), (Venice 1579), fol. 88r, n. 1, citing the gloss Data to l. Assiduis (C. 8.18.12). 
100 His judgment was rendered on the case cited in note 53: “quod non valet talis confessio quoniam aparet quod fui 
confessus habere a te, quia fuisti confessus habere a me, non autem intervenit vera numeratio”. Ibid., fol. 41r. For 
other consilia  on the same line, see FEDERICUS DE SENIS, Consilia et questiones (Paris 1513), s.f., cons. 184: “Tamen 
quia hodie in fraudem pene stipulantis arras in maxima quantitate et promittit quis restituere duplicatas, et tamen 
nihil recepit, crederem de iuris rigore et mente iuris talem stipulationem arrarum fraudulentam fore, et sic alias 
consului, et in hac opininione erat bone memorie dominus Ugelius, episcopus Perusinus decretorum doctor”; 
ANTONIUS DE BUTRIO , Consilia (Venice 1575), fols. 243-244. cons. 71; and MARIANUS SOCINUS, Consilia  (Venice 1579), 
vol. 1, fols. 3r-4r, cons. 3. 
101  PAULUS DE CASTRO  to l. Titia (D. 45.1.134), (Venice 1582), fols. 43v -44r. 
102 ABBAS PANORMITANUS to c. Gemma, fol. 12r, n. 8. 
103 On grounds of l. Si qui sic solvit (D. 46.3.55): “Qui sic solvit ut reciperet, non liberatur”. 
104 On how jurists used the term causa, see CORTESE, La norma giuridica, vol. 1, pp. 183 -255. 
105 BALDUS to l. Mulier (C. 5.1.5), s.f.  
106 BALDUS  to l. Perfecta (C. 4.45.2), s.f. Perhaps aware that Baldus had gone into too much speculation, Jason del 
Maino wrote “de quo scribentes non faciunt mentionem” - meaning that on purpose jurists ignored Baldus’s view 
when discussing arrhae. See his commentary to l. Titia, fol. 188v, n. 24. 
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arrhae and the obligation to return double or fourfold the received arrhae - may be imposed in the 
case of a reciprocal acknowledgment of arrhae attracted the attention of speculative jurists1 0 7 . 
The increase of the amount of arrhae also preoccupied the jurists. The most sustained and 
coherent effort to reduce them to a “token” was made by Bartolus. He started with the 
presumption that sponsalia and matrimonium do not have the same importance. Consequently, 
the penalty imposed for unilaterally withdrawing from a marriage should not be the same as the 
one for withdrawing from sponsalia. The established penalty for breaking up a marriage was the 
loss of the dowry and the gifts given in anticipation of marriage (donatio propter nuptias). No 
penalty was imposed for withdrawing from sponsalia where the arrhae had not yet been given. If 
they had been given, the penalty was that established by l. Mulier. “It is an absurdity”, he argued, 
“if the law penalizes more severely the breaking of sponsalia than matrimonium”. Hence, the 
amount of arrhae ought not to exceed that of the dowry or the gifts given in anticipation of 
marriage, which, as we have noted above, sometimes occurred1 0 8 . Dissenting, Angelus pointed out 
that Bartolus’s argument was unacceptable, for Roman law did not establish any limit on the 
amount of arrhae1 0 9 . Though Bartolus’s opinion remained isolated, jurists agreed that an actual 
cash payment could be the effective way to stop the inflation of arrhae: any person can make a big 
promise but things change drastically when one has to spend money from his or her purse. 
Sometimes arrhae were constituted as a pledge (pignus), such as an immovable, like a house or a 
piece of land, or a movable, like jewelry1 1 0. In case of default, what were the rules for the restitution 
of a pledge, and was one bound to restore double or fourfold? Among medieval jurists these 
questions became the object of dissenting opinions 1 1 1 , especially between Bartolus and his student, 
Baldus. Bartolus asked: “What is the law if I give you a piece of land as arrhae and appoint myself 
as its owner on your behalf”? Done in this form, the transaction is invalid, for actual conveyance of 
the property is required, just as in the case of money1 1 2 . Furthermore, he asserted that when a piece 
of land or an individual thing (species) is given, the dispositions of l. Mulier do not apply for the 
text spoke of things that can be doubled or quadrupled. A sum of money or, more precisely, its 
numerical equivalent can be doubled or quadrupled; an object in itself, never1 1 3 . Though movables 
and immovables have a value, this aspect was immaterial for the jurist, because it was the object 
                                                 
107  See, for instance, the lengthy examination of this issue Jason del Maino made in his commentary to l. Titia (D. 
45.1.134), fol. 189r, n. 29-30; and PAULUS DE CASTRO  to l. Titia, fol. 44r, n. 4, who also did not see favorably the idea of 
a double penalty as proposed by Baldus. 
108 BARTOLUS to l. Titia (D. 45.1.134), vol. 6, fol. 56r, n. 5. 
109 ANGELUS to l. Titia (D. 45.1.134), fol. 88r: “Quia l. ultima [l. Mulier] concedit simpliciter potestatem tradendi arras 
quascumque et vult eas reddi duplicatas. Unde non est restringenda ad certam summam, quia hoc non reperitur l. 
cautum”. See also BALDUS to l. Titia, where Bartolus’s position is dismissed without giving a reason. 
1 1 0 The question whether instead of cash a pledge may be given, which was of paramount importance in a society with 
limited availability of cash, was addressed by Accursius in his gloss Matrimonia to l. Titia  (D. 45.1.134). He admitted 
that a pledge may be given instead of the arrhae, but not as a penalty. 
1 1 1  As Albericus de Rosate pointed out, the use of the term pignus itself is not without problems. Since a pignus was 
given so that it would remain with the receiver, except where marriage is not contracted, calling it pignus  contradicts 
the definition given in the title De pignoribus et hypothecis (D. 20.1). See ALBERICUS DE ROSATE to l. Titia (D. 45.1.134), 
fol. 94r, n. 4. Admittedly, this term was improperly used. 
112  For an example of a model notarial instrument on sponsalia containing such a clause, see G. MOSCHETTI, Il 
cartularium veronese del Magister Ventura del secolo XIII (Naples 1990), pp. 6-8, rubr. Carta nuptiarum futurarum 
cum dote arrarum, and rubr. De sponsalibus. Quot modis contrahantur; ZACCARIA DI MARTINO, Summa artis notarie , 
R. Ferrara (ed) (Bologna 1993), p. 261, rubr. Carta arrarum sponsalium; and ROLANDINUS, Summa, fols. 80v -83r, 
where the parties respectively pledge a house and a piece of land. The legal device Rolandinus employed for this 
transaction was the so -called constitutum possessorium, by which a party transfers possession of an immovable to 
another but continues to hold it under another title. While the party who receives the immovable as arrhae enjoys 
possessory protection, the giving party remains therein as a tenant. For a quaestio  by  the jurist Oldradus de Ponte on a 
piece of land given as arrhae, see M. BELLOMO , “Tracce di lectura per viam quaestionum  in un manoscritto del Codex 
conservato a Rovigo”, RIDC 8 (1997), 255-257, where the quaestio  has been partially edited. 
1 1 3 BARTOLUS  to l. Titia (D. 45.1.134), vol. 6, fol. 56r, n. 10. And D. 31.1.88.7, for the rule that a bequest may be doubled 
only when it is a quantity, not a thing (species). And also the gloss Casus to l. Plane  (D. 30.1.34.1), for the difference 
between species  and quantitas. A species  is an individual thing, analytically  distinguishable from a genus, which are 
kinds of things possessing common qualities. Genus indicates fungibles, where one thing may be replaced by another 
of the same quality, since all the objects included in this category  exercise the same economic function. 
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itself that constituted the pledge1 1 4 . Baldus strongly dissented. “Suppose that not cash but a 
movable or immovable is given as arrhae”, he asked, “does the penalty of the double or fourfold 
apply”? Pledges given as arrhae, being quantifiable, increase (crescunt in certo corpore) 1 1 5 . When 
money is given as a pledge, money is traded not as a genus but as a fixed thing, and pledges exist 
not as a genus but as a fixed thing1 1 6 . “Supposing that Bartolus’s view is true”, Baldus went on, “in 
a sum given as a species there is no duplication, which is false”. When considered as an object or 
individual body, a sum of money cannot be multiplied. Yet its value (estimatio) may be doubled. 
“On this point”, he concluded, “my master (doctor meus) was wrong”1 1 7 . Baldus’s reductionistic 
approach was not entirely  convincing. His brother Angelus, endorsing Bartolus’s view, stated that 
things that cannot be doubled or quadrupled fell outside the purview of l. Mulier1 1 8 . Paulus de 
Castro, on the other hand, qualified Bartolus’s view. If Bartolus thought that one giving an 
individual thing as arrhae might not lose it where the marriage was not contracted owing to the 
fault of the giver, he was wrong, because the loss of the thing applied to both quantity and the 
individual thing itself. If he thought that the person receiving the pledge was bound to return the 
thing itself rather than double its value, if he or she withdrew from the marriage, Bartolus’s 
opinion is plausible (habet colorem) 1 1 9 . Yet Paulus was forced to admit that individual things can 
be quantified. 
Canonists, too, admitted that a pignus was a difficulty-ridden issue around which contrasting 
opinions swirled. Abbas Panormitanus, following Bartolus, accepted the view that a pledge cannot 
be multiplied. If so, it could not be treated like arrhae, which could be doubled, tripled, or 
quadrupled. Furthermore, l. Mulier did not contemplate the case of a pledge, but only the transfer 
of money from one party to another. Accordingly, pledges could not be used, unless their value was 
supplemented in case of default (pro interesse prestando) 1 2 0. Women in Italy today who, upon 
breaking their engagement, opt to keep the engagement ring and restore its monetary value, while 
welcoming Baldus’s opinion, would nonetheless be receptive to Bartolus’s insight into the 
uniqueness and symbolic value of things. 
Without examining a large sample of notarial sponsalia, it remains difficult to assess how 
frequently pledges were used. Indirect evidence that they were used can be gleaned form the 
commentaries of jurists and model notarial sponsalia contracts. Odofredus reported that upon 
contracting sponsalia giving pledges to a commonly trusted friend was a Bolognese custom1 2 1 . This 
custom bears a resemblance to Jewish customs, which required the betrothing parties to consign 
equivalent amounts of earnest money to a third party. Upon breach of contract, the earnest money 
would be duly conveyed to the nonbreaching party1 2 2 . Moreover, according to Odofredus, canon 
lawyers counseled people to give pledges instead of arrhae 1 2 3 . For other jurists, there were no basic 
objections to giving pledges, provided that they were in fact transferred, not just promised1 2 4 . After 
                                                 
114 On the symbolic value of land in medieval culture, see P. GROSSI, L’ordine giuridico medievale  (Roma-Bari 1995), 
pp.  74-7 5 . 
1 1 5 In Roman law, certum means a fixed sum or quantity of things constituting the object of a transaction, obligation, 
or claim. 
116 For a pledge as an identifiable object (res certa), see the gloss Quod magis est to l. Pignus (D. 13.7.1). 
1 1 7  BALDUS to l. Mulier (C. 5.1.5), s.f.  
118 See, for instance, ANGELUS to l. Titia, fol. 109r, n. 6. 
119 PAULUS DE CASTRO  to l. Titia (D. 45.1.134), fol. 44, n. 4. 
120  ABBAS PANORMITANUS ad c. Gemma , fol. 13v, n. 10, where he lists the major jurists who supported the pledge and 
their reasons. 
121  ODOFREDUS to l. Titia  (D. 45.1.134), fol. 136v, n. 3: “Sed pignora, ut fit in civitate ista, trado amico communi, ut si 
stet per me vel ex parte mea, pignus perdatur; vel si per te mulierem vel ex parte tua pignus tuus perdatur”. Note that 
Odofredus speaks of returning the pledge; there is no discussion of returning double its value. 
122 I. ABRAHAMS , Jewish Life in the Middle Ages (1896) (Philadelphia and Jerusalem 1993), p. 177; S. D. GOITEIN, A 
Mediterranean Society. The Jewish Communities of the Arab World as Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo 
Geniza, 3: The Family  (Berkeley 1978), pp. 65ff. For examples of broken promises of future marriage among Jewish 
families, see A. TOAFF, Love, Work, and Death. Jewish Life in Medieval Umbria, translated by J. Landry (London 
1996), pp. 27 -28. 
123 ODOFREDUS to l. Alii desponsata  (C. 5.1.1), fol. 262v, n. 3: “sed dicunt quod debent dari pignora ad invicem, sicut fit 
tota die in civitate ista”. 
124 RAINERIUS DE FORLIVIO  to l. Titia (Lyon 1523), fol. 86v. 
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all, since Roman law did not prohibit them; they were allowed1 2 5 . Among the notaries, Rolandinus 
furnished a model sponsalium contract in which arrhae consisted of a house and a piece of land. 
He also explained why and when the parties opted for immovables or cash. If the interval between 
sponsalia and marriage was long, the parties opted for immovables such as land or houses. If the 
two events were close in time, the parties opted for cash. But in an explanatory note to his Ars 
notarie, the author qualified this view as a “personal view, not a necessary one” (voluntarium 
dictum non autem necessarium) and asserted that the parties could not be forced to choose a 
particular option1 2 6 . 
In contrast to the dowry, where an action (actio rei uxorie) for the recovery of the dowry lay 
against the husband, Roman law did not grant any specific action to enforce a penal stipulation 
attached to sponsalia 1 2 7 . The rules regulating arrhae probably sufficed. The progressive 
importance sponsalia assumed in the Middle Ages stirred jurists to consider the question of 
whether an action for breach of a promise to marry may be granted. Their quest faced an 
insurmountable obstacle in l. Mulier, which prohibited inserting any penal stipulation, except the 
arrhae, in sponsalia contracts, since no one could enter marriage under the threat of penalty. Azo 
searched the Corpus iuris for an answer to the question, but in the end was forced to admit: “I 
cannot find one” - thereby indicating that Roman law did not recognize a specific action in cases of 
broken betrothal promises1 2 8 . Accursius thought that an action ad interesse - that is, for damage - 
might be granted to the aggrieved party1 2 9 . While leaning toward Azo’s view, Odofredus thought 
that Accursius’s concession required qualifications. Ordinarily, an action ad interesse was out of 
the question, for it was tantamount to stipulating a penalty. But there was one exception to 
withholding the actio ad interesse: when a poor young man contracts sponsalia with a rich widow 
and she refuses to marry him, he may sue for interesse1 3 0. Petrus de Bellapertica flatly rejected 
Accursius’s view. If an action is granted, he stated, “marriages would be contracted on the basis of 
interesse”. Just as stipulating a penalty was forbidden, so granting an action ad interesse 
amounted to allowing the parties do in one way what was forbidden by another1 3 1 . 
Dynus de Musiello made the telling distinction between an action directed at recovering lucrum 
and an action directed at recovering damnum1 3 2 . An action for the recovery of any loss directly 
resulting from the broken promise was not a penalty but a rei persecutio - an action by which a 
thing is sued for. An action aiming at a future gain (lucrum), or the future advantages marriage 
might have brought to a party, is prohibited, on the grounds that the marriage was not yet 
contracted and granting the action would be comparable to a penalty. The challenge medieval 
jurists faced was aptly presented by Cynus de Pistorio. Granting an unqualified action ad interesse, 
as Accursius thought, meant that an action for a penalty was available to the aggrieved party, 
which was forbidden by l. Mulier. At the same time, it was difficult for a jurist to think that a 
stipulation bereft of force could exist, as such a stipulation was utterly useless. But the truth was 
that an unenforceable stipulation indeed existed, because by law a penal stipulation in sponsalia  
contracts worked only with regard to the arrhae 1 3 3 . The distinction between a future lucrum and a 
                                                 
125 BALDUS to l. Perfecta (C. 4.45.2), s.f.  
126 ROLANDINUS, Summa, fol. 83r. 
127  Emperor Theodosius granted an action (ex bono et aequo) for withdrawing from the sponsalia. This action was 
granted to a sponsa  who had reached puberty and was sui iuris, against the person who contracted the sponsalia for 
her. On this, see C. Th. 3.5.11.4. 
128 AZO, Summa codicis ad tit. De sponsalibus (C. 5.1), Venice 1581, coll. 7 7 1-774.  
129 Gloss Matrimonia  to l. Titia (D. 45.1.134): “forte valet interesse”. See also the gloss Si sororem to l. Si stipulor (D. 
45.1.35), for the assertion that a stipulation violating the accepted ethical standards of a community (boni mores) is 
not binding. Since the reiteration of this principle occurred in relation to marriage, Accursius’s view seemed 
inconsistent to other jurists. 
130 ODOFREDUS to l. Alii desponsata, fol. 262v, n. 2. 
131  PETRUS DE BELLAPERTICA  ad l. Titia, fol. 354, n. 5. 
132 On these two concepts, which were also widely employed in the debate on usury, see A. SPICCIANI, Capitale e 
interesse nei teologi e canonisti dei secoli XIII-XIV (Naples 1990), pp. 17-48; see also H. J. WIELING, Interesse und 
Privatstrafe vom Mittelalter bis zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch (Cologne and Vienna 1970), pp. 26ff.  
133 CYNUS to l. Alii desponsata (C. 5.1.1), fol. 286v, n. 5. 
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past damnum enabled jurists to overcome the impasse1 3 4 . Canon lawyers, as well, accepted the 
distinction and recognized that the aggrieved party could bring an action to recover the loss1 3 5 . 
The always-imaginative Baldus recast the debate. Suppose that there are two sponsae, one rich and 
the other richer, and both are willing to contract sponsalia with me by words of future consent. I 
choose the richer, who promises me thousands as interesse in the event she fails to marry me 
because of the loss I suffer for not marring the rich one. May the aggrieved party legitimately bring 
an action ad interesse? Baldus proposed that if the promise reflects an actual loss suffered, the 
sponsus can bring an action for compensation, where, for instance, he expended a great amount of 
money in preparation for the impending marriage. If the promise reflects a future gain conditional 
on the marriage, the sponsus cannot bring any action, since that would be a condition forcing one 
into marriage. An action claiming that the richer party had committed fraud (dolus) was also 
available to the sponsus. But if an agreement violated the ethical standards of a community (boni 
mores), as in sponsalia carrying a penal stipulation, one who disregards it does not incur dolus. A 
finer distinction was needed. Clearly, if the agreement is construed as a penalty, it has no validity. 
If, on the other hand, the agreement is construed as true interesse, it is considered just and 
reasonable and does not violate the ethical standards of the community. Its purpose, Baldus 
asserted, was not “ad impediendum matrimonium” but “ad impediendum calumniam” - that is, to 
prevent dishonor. With an eye to practice, he advised against construing interesse in a formalistic 
way or in strict accordance with the agreement and in favor of proving its validity in court by 
presumptive evidence (verisimiles coniecturas). The grounds for suing for interesse did not rest on 
the unwillingness to contract marriage but on the agreement and the damage one suffered because 
the other party broke the agreement without legitimate cause1 3 6 . 
Baldus’s doctrine stressed the need to penalize the party whose breach of the sponsalia served to 
humiliate and shame the jilted party. The breaching party was not only liable for causing damages, 
but also incurred infamia. The action ad interesse was the basis on which ecclesiastical courts in 
the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries compelled the breaching party to compensate the jilted party 
for expenditures made in connection with the marriage and litigation. The action ad interesse 
remains behind the articuli of Italy’s Codice Civile of 1865 and the present Codice, which grant an 
action to the aggrieved party to sue for the recovery of the expenditures in preparation of marriage 
(see below, 000). It also remains behind the Japanese Civil Code, which leaves to custom the field 
of engagement (konyaku) but allows a party to recover the gifts (e.g., rings and expensive items) 
given in anticipation of marriage. In contrast, the French Civil Code ignores altogether the 
“promise of marriage” and protects the party who suffers loss because of an unjustified breach of 
the sponsalia by granting an action grounded in Aquilian responsibility. It has been pointed out 
that this approach opens the way to suing for unreasonable damages. 
 
Preceptum Guarentigie 
Under Florentine law, the obligation to pay even large sums of arrhae was enforceable and served 
as an effective deterrent. Since the early thirteenth century, Florentines and other Tuscans had 
placed their confidence in the summary procedure known as preceptum guarentigie to compel the 
defaulting party to pay arrhae. As Briegleb and Campitelli have remarked, this popular procedure, 
which derived from Germanic law, was used to compel the timely payment of debt obligations in 
myriad commercial and credit contracts without undergoing time-consuming court proceedings1 3 7 . 
                                                 
134 The distinction was accepted also by Albericus de Rosate, who included the fee for the mediators among the losses a 
party may suffer; see his commentary to l. Alii desponsata  (C. 5.1.1), fol. 245r, n. 4; and to l. Mulier (C. 5.1.5), fol. 245v, 
n. 6. 
135 IOHANNES ANDREAE to c. Gemma  (X 4.1.29), fol. 13v, n. 7; ANTONIUS DE BUTRIO  to c. Gemma , fol. 23r, n. 7; ID., 
Consilia (Venice 1575), fols. 243-44, cons. 70; FRANCISCUS DE ZABARELLIS  to c. Gemma (Venice 1602), fol. 6v, n. 6; 
ABBAS PANORMITANUS to c. Gemma, fol. 12v, n. 11. 
136 BALDUS to l. Mulier (C. 5.1.5), s.f.  
137  H. K. BRIEGLEB, Geschichte des Executiv-Prozesses (über executorische Urkunden und Executiv-Prozesses, 1. Tail), 
(2nd edition Stuttgart 1845), pp. 35-83; A. CAMPITELLI, Precetto di guarentigia e formule di esecuzione parata nei 
documenti italiani del secolo XIII  (Milan 1970); and the same author’s “Una raccolta di quaestiones in tema di 
documenti guarentigiati e il Tractatus de guarentigiato instrumento  attribuito a Guido da Suzzara”, in Studi sulle 
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Municipal statutes sanctioned this institution and made it into a powerful tool in the hands of 
merchants and bankers. Widely  utilized, it was attached to contracts and transactions to ensure 
the prompt execution of the clauses therein contained, including the payment of arrhae. The 
procedure worked as follows. The parties acknowledged to a public notary that they willingly 
submitted to summary procedure, and their acknowledgment was duly inserted in the contract. In 
effect, they promised, as if in a court of law, to accept full liability in the event of any future breach 
of contract they might commit. Further, they  simultaneously agreed to waive their right to contest 
the entry of judgment ordering them to pay the arrhae. In a betrothal contract the breaching party 
was treated as the debtor, who had to indemnify the damaged party, the creditor. 
What the parties wished to accomplish with such betrothal contracts containing a preceptum 
guarentigiatum is aptly described by Odofredus. “Everyday citizens of this city (Bologna) and of all 
the world”, he stated, come to a jurist wishing that “one’s son would contract sponsalia with the 
daughter of another. And both children are minors”. The parties, then, ask the jurist “to make the 
sponsalia between my son and the other party ’s daughter and bind us in such a way that we cannot 
withdraw from the contract with impunity”. He advised his students to avoid such arrangements 
and forthwith to explain to the parties that their wishes could not be executed, because the 
insertion of a penal stipulation in a betrothal contract violates the principle of the freedom of 
marriage. Yet, if the parties persisted, Odofredus offered a solution: in contrast to the canonists 
“we, the civilian jurists, handle the situation in the following way”1 3 8 . He recommended arrhae, to 
which an oath could be added, as it was “customary in Pisa and all Tuscany”, as an effective legal 
device for binding the parties in such a way that neither one could break the carefully planned 
strategic alliance between the two families1 3 9 .  A century later, Baldus continued to refer to the 
widespread custom confirming the (fictitious) acknowledgment of arrhae and to the statutes 
sanctioning that custom by making available to the parties the preceptum guarentigie1 4 0. 
 
Consilia 
In truth, the large majority of notarized Florentine betrothals, propelled forward by social 
pressures, and the prospect of losing arrhae, culminated in marriages. Where marriage did not 
follow, the death of a party or other uncontrollable circumstances were usually responsible. Still, a 
small, and probably unquantifiable, number of cases involving alleged breaches of notarized 
betrothal contracts were adjudicated in the court of the podestà. At issue was the operation of the 
preceptum guarentigie and payment of arrhae. Given the jumble of conflicting rules on betrothals, 
civil law judges and litigants routinely asked local jurists to present consilia addressing and 
resolving the issues of fact and law that had caused the dispute. We examine two such consilia 
composed by Angelus de Ubaldis, which we have edited and included in appendix 3. From internal 
evidence, it is almost certain that the two consilia were rendered during the period when Angelus 
was teaching at the University of Florence from 1387/88 until the beginning of October 1391, when 
he left to teach at Bologna1 4 1 . In 1398/99, he resumed his chair in Florence, where he taught until 
                                                                                                                                                                                
quaestiones civilistiche disputate nelle università medievali, M. Bellomo (ed) (Catania 1980), pp. 57-96. For many 
examples of disputes over contracts carrying the preceptum guarentigiatum, see M. CHIANTINI, Il consilium sapientis 
nel processo del secolo XIII: San Gimignano 1246-1312 (Siena 1996). 
138 ODOFREDUS to l. Alii desponsata (C. 5.1.1), fol. 262v, n. 2. 
139 Adding an oath to the sponsalia was more problematic; see ODOFREDUS to l. Titia (D. 45.1.134), fol. 136v, n. 4; and 
to l. Alii desponsata, fol. 262v, n. 2. Bartolus also agreed that an oath could not be introduced to validate the will of the 
parties, when the betrothal contract could not be redacted within the parameters of law. See his commentary to l. Titia, 
vol. 6, fol. 56r, n. 11: “Quero an in predictis casibus, ubi de iure non valet, potest firmari iuramento? Respondeo: non”. 
On the oath, see P. PRODI, Il sacramento del potere. Il giuramento politico nella storia costituzionale dell’Occidente 
(Bologna 1992), pp. 63-160. 
140  BALDUS  to l. Mulier (C. 5.1.5), s.f.: “Et ideo consuetudo generalis approbat istam confessionem et istam dationem 
arrarum, et maxime statuta Italie ubi intervenit guarentigia, id est preceptum”. 
141  On the jurist, see L. CHIAPPELLI, “Un consilium inedito di Angelo da Perugia”, Archivio giuridico  36 (1886): 102-115; 
O. SCALVANTI, “Notizie e documenti sulla vita di Baldo, Angelo e Pietro degli Ubaldi”, in L’opera di Baldo, per cura 
dell’Università di Perugia nel V centenario della morte del grande giureconsulto  (Perugia 1901); pp. 279-98; T. 
CUTURI, “Angelo degli Ubaldi in Firenze”, Bolletino della R. Deputazaione di Storia Patria per l’Umbria 7 (1901): 189-
221; H. DENLIFLE, Die Entstehung der Universitäten des Mittelaters bis 1400 (Berlin 1885), pp. 564-565; P. COLLIVA, 
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his death in 1400. During his Florentine years, Angelus was an active consultor, rendering 
opinions on cases in both the city and its territory and lending his endorsement (subscriptio) to 
consilia penned by colleagues1 4 2 . 
 
Consilium I 
The facts provided in the punctus, along with the terms of the sponsalium, which both notaries 
and jurists knew by heart, were, as a matter of course, abbreviated. Male and female ascendants of 
two families promised each other to see and ensure (facturos et curaturos) that the son of one 
would take as his wife the daughter of the other. Since the instrument was a sponsalium, it is 
obvious that the sponsus and sponsa were more than seven years old but had not yet reached the 
canonical age for contracting a legally valid marriage. In the same instrument of betrothal the 
parties reciprocally  acknowledged that they had received a thousand florins as arrhae with the 
understanding that, in the case one of them failed to fulfill the terms of the contract, the breaching 
party would return to the aggrieved party double the amount of arrhae. It happened that one party 
unilaterally broke the contract. The aggrieved party sued for the simple amount of arrhae. Since 
the parties had attached a preceptum guarentigiatum to the contract, the court official who 
drafted the punctus also transcribed part of the relevant rubric of the Florentine statutes on the 
preceptum guarentigiatum. The punctus ends with the question of whether or not the preceptum 
guarentigiatum is enforceable. 
We are left in the dark about the precise ages of the sponsus and sponsa, the names of their 
families, the reason for breaking the contract and who broke it, and why the aggrieved party sued 
only for the simple amount of arrhae and not double, as originally stipulated. The court official 
was obviously puzzled, too, because the reciprocal stipulation on arrhae was inserted in the 
instrument. Was that Florentine practice? Did the reciprocal acknowledgment mean that both 
parties had exchanged a thousand florins or had deposited them with a trusted person? Or was the 
reciprocal acknowledgement a mere promise to pay a penalty in the event a party breached the 
contract? The skeletal outline of the punctus and the lack of information were no obstacle to 
Angelus, an expert on disputes in which the competence of civil law, canon law, and statutory 
dispositions overlapped. The structure of the opinion follows the pattern of arguments pro-et-
contra. Judging from the style of the argumentation, we regard it as a consilium sapientis, an 
impartial opinion commissioned by the court, not an opinion written at the request and on behalf 
of one of the parties. 
The technical question on enforceability did not at all prevent Angelus from casting his net wider 
than the immediate issue of whether or not one party should be compelled to pay a thousand 
florins. Theoretically, the preceptum guarentigiatum could be attached to a stipulation for 
performing acts prosecutable under criminal law - for example, hiring someone to commit 
homicide or steal, or to commit a sinful and immoral act like sacrilege. Since municipal legislation 
made the preceptum unconditionally executable, was it enforceable even in the case of an immoral 
act or a crime? And, if not, why? In view of the principle upholding the freedom of marriage, are 
arrhae permitted, or should they be treated as a penalty? Lastly, what distinguishes arrhae from a 
penalty1 4 3 ? 
                                                                                                                                                                                
“Angelo degli Ubaldi e le Constitutiones Aegidiane ”, Archivio giuridico  184 (1973): 103-120; E. SPAGNESI, Utiliter 
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142 Some examples: J. KIRSHNER, “A Question of Trust: Suretyship in Trecento Florence”, in Renaissance Studies in 
Honor of Craig Hugh Smyth (Florence 1985), vol. 1 , pp. 1 29-45; Id.,  “Materials for a Gilded Cage: Non-Dotal Assets in 
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143 For the sake of brevity and operating on the assumption that his fellow jurists, the judge, and the court would be 
familiar with earlier doctrines and opinions, Angelus reduced the extensive debate over the permissibility of arrhae to 
the opinions of Bernardus of Parma and Innocent IV. 
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“At first sight”, Angelus began, “it seems that the said instrument containing a preceptum 
guarentigiatum deserves no implementation at all, for the contract violates the commonly 
accepted standards of a community (boni mores) requiring that present and future marriages not 
be secured by the fetters of a penalty”. More generally, all contracts and agreements violating the 
accepted community standards have no force, do not entitle either party to bring an action or raise 
an exception, and do not create even a natural obligation1 4 4 . Such agreements may not be secured 
by taking an oath. In short, the standard doctrine on agreements, by which any agreement 
involving illegal and immoral matters was voided by law, made the betrothal contract invalid and 
unenforceable1 4 5 . 
Next, Angelus considered an objection grounded in the unconditional enforceability of 
instruments containing a preceptum guarentigiatum. On details, one may argue that, since the 
statute aimed at expediting the payment of debts, a betrothal contract falls outside the statutory 
dispositions. More substantially, a rigid application of the statute produces absurd consequences. 
Paradoxically, if the preceptum is attached to a contract, no matter how shameful and wrong its 
content may be, it follows that the contract must be implemented. Perversely , marriages between 
ascendants and descendants would be permissib le, a sacrilege or a crime would be allowed, and 
detestable deeds would be performed, as they were all secured by the preceptum. But this was an 
absurdity violating divine and human law, as well as canon and civil law. A literal interpretation 
and application of the statute would lead to impermissible consequences1 4 6 . 
Reversing course, Angelus now argued in favor of enforcing the betrothal instrument. He conceded 
that, as matter of general principle, attaching a penal stipulation to a betrothal or marriage 
contract is prohibited by civil and canon law alike. Yet, “though we may call arrhae a penalty, 
nonetheless they do not have the same effect as a penalty ”. What distinguished arrhae and a 
penalty was “the reason for which arrhae were not given” - that is, they were not given as a penalty. 
If they had the same effect, arrhae would have been prohibited by canon and civil law. But civil law 
established that arrhae could be lawfully retained when, by fault of the giving party , marriage was 
not contracted, whereas they must be restored, doubled or quadrupled, when the receiving party 
was at fault. In contrast to Roman law, however, Angelus held that the breaching recipient was 
responsible for returning double, not quadruple, the amount of arrhae1 4 7 . 
Adhering to mainstream doctrine, Angelus stressed that the reciprocal acknowledgment of arrhae 
made in the same instrument was invalid. Yet its invalidity could not be raised as an exception, for 
the statute on the preceptum forbade ipso iure the defendant from presenting any exception 
whatsoever. “There are many deeds”, he insisted, “that are utterly invalid by law; nonetheless, their 
nullity may not be produced, for the statute or municipal legislation shuts the mouth of one who 
wishes to allege their nullity”. Similarly, the statutes may prohibit the judge from hearing such 
defenses. Municipal legislation enacted against the magnates and the dispositions on contumacy 
was a case in point. If a statute establishing that one may not be heard in court is valid, “it becomes 
invalid when worded in the following way: that justice should be denied to one person, for in this 
case it would be in violation of the law of God”1 4 8 . 
Now, Angelus answered the objections. To the argument that a preceptum attached to an 
agreement may validate any deed, such as marrying an ascendant or descendant, permitting 
                                                 
144 For the actionability of a natural obligation under the ius commune , see J. GORDLEY, The Philosophical Origins of 
Modern Contract Doctrine  (Oxford 1991), pp. 40-6 7 . 
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marriage within prohibited degrees, or perpetrating a crime, he readily acknowledged that 
immoral deeds are forbidden by all the laws. In these instances the laws deny tout court the 
capacity of persons to enter into such immoral agreements. Yet there are deeds “in conflict with 
the commonly accepted standards of a community”, he went on, “only because of a civil law 
disposition”. Where conflict between deed and norm arises because of a civil law disposition, 
municipal statutes may be enacted contrary to civil law standards. In short, practices that are not 
in conformity with the ius commune may be permitted solely on the basis of the authority of 
municipal statutes. The logical conclusion was that the instrument on the reciprocal 
acknowledgment of arrhae must be enforced regarding the simple amount. Even the doubts the 
court had entertained on the proper form of the notarial instrument served as an additional 
argument supporting Angelus’s main thesis. If the wording of the instrument conformed to 
Florentine notarial practice, it was valid and must be enforced. Different communities have 
different customs and standards, and notarial practice, as one would expect, reflects local customs. 
Consequently, one has to follow local customs, for where the conflict is between two customs, there 
is no compelling reason to prefer one over the other. 
This case reveals that Florentine practices of betrothal among upper-level families were an exercise 
in risk management. Legal devices - such as the high amount of arrhae, their reciprocal 
acknowledgment without actual transfer of cash, and the attachment of a preceptum 
guarentigiatum to the betrothal contract - bound the two families with an ironclad contract, and, 
if no impediment occurred between betrothal and marriage, the alliance was secured. Though we 
do not now how the court ruled, Angelus’s consilium underscored the high risks involved in the 
Florentine strategic management of betrothal contracts. At the end of Trecento, a loss of a 
thousand florins was a substantial amount, as one can surmise from the amount of the dowries we 
have cited above. It comes as no surprise that jurists insisted on the actual transfer of money for a 
valid stipulation on arrhe to avoid an unhappy outcome in which the breaching party became a 
victim of his or her own fiction1 4 9 . 
 
Consilium II 
The facts of the second case centered on an agreement concluded between lady Massina, with the 
consent of her guardian (mundualdus) 1 5 0, and Eusepio on the future betrothal and marriage of 
their minor children. Under the agreement, Massina’s daughter, Sera, immediately after the month 
of February, 1390, upon the completion of her twelfth birthday, would consent to take Pellegrino, 
Eusepio’s son, as her lawful spouse and husband (sponsum et virum legitimum). Next, Sera would 
contract lawful marriage with Pellegrino and accept from him wedding rings. Massina herself 
would pay Pellegrino Sera’s dowry, a certain amount consisting of cash and things. It was 
stipulated that Sera and Massina would fulfill all these promises at a future time and in a way that 
would be decided by the arbiters, a certain Antonio and Lorenzo, selected by both parties. More 
specifically, it was left to the arbiters to fix the dates of betrothal and marriage, the exact amount 
and composition of the dowry, and the method of payment. For his part, Eusepio promised that 
Pellegrino, immediately after the month of May, 1391, upon the completion of his fourteenth 
birthday, would reciprocate Sera’s consent to their betrothal and marriage1 5 1 . 
                                                 
149 Angelus’s consilium did not go unnoticed, and his passing note on the invalidity of reciprocal acknowledgment of 
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150  On the practice of guardianship of women in Florence, see T. KUEHN, “Cum Consensu Mundualdi: Legal 
Guardianship of Women in Quattrocento Florence”, in Law, Family, & Women. Toward a legal Anthropology of 
Renaissance Italy (Chicago 1991), pp. 212-237.  
151  For another Florentine betrothal contract closely resembling that between Massina and Eusepio, see MARIANUS 
SOCINUS, Consilia, vol. I, fol. 3r. In the case on which the Senese jurist was asked to give his opinion, both the sponsus 
and sponsa  were younger than the required minimum of seven years; the dowry was set at eight hundred florins and 
the arrhae at five hundred; both parties reciprocally acknowledged the receipt of the arrhae; and the standard 
preceptum guarentigiatum  was added to the contract. Sozzini advised that, despite the insertion of the preceptum 
guarentigiatum, the breaching party was not obligated to return double the amount of the arrhae, since the contract 
was utterly invalid owing to the ages of the sponsus and sponsa. 
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The abbreviated format of the punctus, however, leaves us in the dark regarding the social identity 
of the parties and the place where the agreement and dispute took place. Although Massina was 
not identified as a widow, it is almost certain that she was, for her husband was duty bound to 
marry off his filia familias, which he would have done had he been alive. The omission of 
surnames, which was usually done for the sake of brevity, prevents us from gauging the contracting 
parties’ social standing. In the absence of toponymic surnames or any mention of place, we cannot 
be certain that the parties were Florentine or that the dispute occurred in Florence. Nor can we say 
with certainty whether consilium II was solicited by the court or one of the parties to bolster its 
case. It is apparent from Angelus’s consilium that the dispute occurred in Tuscany, but not 
necessarily in Florence. Similarly, the presence of a mundualdus, a Florentine institution, with 
dates in Florentine style (ab incarnatione), were practices shared by nearby communities in the 
contado, distretto, and other parts of Tuscany. If not definitive, Angelus’s linking of consilium II 
with consilium I, discussed above, is yet another piece of indirect evidence suggesting that the case 
was being litigated in a court under the jurisdiction of Florence and subject to its statutes. 
To avoid confusion, it should be remembered that in Florence the new year began on March 25th , 
the day of the feast of the Annunciation, making Pellegrino’s fourteenth birthday fall in May 1391, 
rather than May 1390, in accordance with the solar calendar, in which the new year begins on the 
first of January. The salient point here is that, based on the facts provided in the punctus, 
Pellegrino would have reached the legal age for marriage only two months after Sera had 
completed her twelfth birthday, rather than fourteen months later. In his consilium, however, 
Angelus never used the expression ab incarnatione 1 5 2 ; he used only anno domini, which referred 
to the solar calendar. Inexplicably, perhaps unconsciously, and we believe in error, Angelus 
seemed to have reverted to the solar calendar of his native city, Perugia. In Angelus’s reckoning, or 
as he said, according to the facts furnished him, Pellegrino was fourteen months older than Sera. It 
may be objected that Angelus had not erred, because he also used the expression recte calculo 
computato, together with anno domini, thus calling attention to a subtler way of counting year s. 
Yet, in context, the expression meant “counting more precisely”, that is, counting down to the 
months. 
Consilium II opened with a reaffirmation of consilium I: “Just as I advised in the above-mentioned 
case”, Angelus declared, “so likewise here I approv e once more all that is stated in the above 
consilium and affirm that it was consonant with the law and well advised”. Angelus’s reaffirmation 
suggests that the judge who commissioned consilium II may have been familiar with consilium I 
and the case which it addressed. If so, the reaffirmation released Angelus from repeating or 
summarizing the tenor of the earlier consilium. It is also conceivable that Angelus felt that the 
reaffirmation was necessary to forestall any inference that his opinion in the present case 
contradicted consilium I. The present case differed from the earlier one in that here one of the 
arbiters had died before declaring the date on which the marriage was to occur, therefore 
terminating the agreement. The arbiter’s premature death, however, did not discourage 
Pellegrino’s father from formally notifying Massina, immediately after Sera’s twelfth birthday in 
February, that the time for marriage was at hand or had passed. Formal notification was necessary 
when the date for fulfilling an obligation was uncertain, thus placing the other party in default. The 
concrete issue Angelus was asked to resolve was whether Massina and Sera had broken the 
betrothal contract. 
Angelus responded: “At that time, unless fraud had altered his age, Pellegrino was incapable of 
contracting marriage, although he could enter into a contract of betrothal (sponsalium)”1 5 3 . While 
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this was technically true, the two-step sequence, betrothal followed by marriage, was not stipulated 
in the contract. The convoluted wording of the contract, as Angelus construed it, stipulated that 
the betrothal, the ringing of the bride, and the marriage would all take place at the same time: 
The agreement was conceived as follows - namely, that the said girl will consent to take Pellegrino 
as her lawful spouse and husband; and that she will accept from him wedding rings; and that she 
will contract lawful marriage with him. Therefore, the words, “spouse” [sponsus] and “husband” 
[vir] are interchangeable, as is customary among the Tuscans, for whom women are espoused by 
having rings placed on their fingers [subharatio]. For then, reciprocally and in mutual agreement, 
one to the other and vice versa, the bridegroom [desponsans] gives his consent to the bride 
[desponsatam] to take her as his lawful spouse [sponsa] and wife [uxor]. And she gives her 
consent to the bridegroom to take him as her spouse and husband. And then, as is customary, the 
notary will ask the bride if she consents to take him as her spouse and husband. Likewise, the 
husband is asked if he consents to take her as his lawful spouse and wife, and both answer that 
they will. Therefore, the parties to this agreement did not intend that betrothal should occur first 
and marriage afterwards, but that both should occur at the same time. However, since betrothal 
and marriage could not happen, as a matter of law, default was not incurred. 
 
Angelo’s foregrounding of the temporal unity of Tuscan betrothal and marriage rites was roughly  
consistent with practice, for, as we have observed, the betrothal and marriage of a couple on the 
same day did occur in late Trecento Florence. 
Next, Angelus pronounced that on grammatical grounds the clauses in the agreement supported 
his argument that Massina and Sera would not have to fulfill their obligations until after the month 
of May, when Pellegrino would be legally capable of contracting a present-consent marriage. He 
concluded that it was impossible for default to have occurred, since the time for contracting 
marriage had not been declared by the arbiters: “If, therefore, the time for contracting the 
marriage, paying the dowry, and determining its amount, as well as the means by which all this 
should be carried out, were unconditionally placed at the discretion of the arbiters, there can be no 
default whatsoever before a declaration is made by the said arbiters concerning the time when and 
the means by which all this should be carried out, provided the facts are as they were disclosed to 
me”. Finally, under a bilateral contract carrying reciprocal obligations, as in this case, the 
defendant cannot be placed in default unless the plaintiff first fulfills his obligations. Since it was 
legally impossible for Eusepio and Pellegrino to fulfill their own contractual obligations, there were 
no legal grounds for suing Massina and Sera for nonperformance. 
We have no idea what motivated Massina to withdraw from the contract after the arbiter’s death. 
Perhaps she had found a better match for her daughter. Whatever the motives, it seems that in 
contrast to the first case, the parties resorted neither to the fictitious acknowledgment of arrhae 
nor to the preceptum guarentigiatum to cement the contract. Again, in the first case, the 
sponsalia had been unilaterally broken, and the issue was whether the agreed-upon penalty could 
be lawfully imposed, whereas in the second the issue was whether Massina’s decision itself 
constituted a breach of contract. In consilium II, Angelus rehearsed, but then moved beyond, time-
honored doctrines regarding the differences between sponsalia and matrimonium and the 
invalidity of marriage vows owing to an impediment of nonage. As in consilium I, he accented the 
wishes of the parties as instantiated in their mutual agreements and the constitutive role of 
municipal law and local customs in the construction and the operation of betrothal contracts. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
translates the technical expression “in eam aetatem malitia non suppleret” as “difettava di quella malitia che in 
qualche modo avrebbe potuto compensare la sua minore età”. In view of canons c. De illis  (X. 4.2.9) and c. Tue nobis 
(X. 4.2.14), and the glosses Nubilis e Prudentia, the term malitia may be understood as vigor naturalis and potentia 
coeundi - in short, physical capacity to have sexual intercourse. For this meaning, see Iohannes Andreae ad c. De illis 
(X. 4.2.9), fol. 18v, n. 3. How the therm malitia  - which in post-classical Latin also means unfruitfulnes or barreness, 
as in the expression terrae malitia or malitia arboris - came to used in this way requires further investigation. 
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Highlights and Contrasts 
Our study is the first to highlight the interplay of Roman and canon law jurisprudence, together 
with municipal law and local customs, in making and breaking betrothal contracts. Although 
notarial manuals regularly featured model contracts of sponsalia, our preliminary archival 
research suggests that betrothal contracts were few and far between. No doubt, upper-level 
families, as in Florence, relied on betrothal contracts for arranging the future marriage of minor 
children, when the interval between betrothal and marriage might be a year or longer. Florentine 
betrothal contracts attest to the strategic competence of Florentine families to contract alliances 
from which neither party  could withdraw with impunity1 5 4 . The cases we have discussed, along 
with the novelle, point to the instrumental role that widows played in arranging betrothals and 
marriages. Arrhae were one of the devices employed to construct an ironclad contract. Although 
arrhae were necessary, they proved insufficient, so that an oath and the preceptum 
guarentigiatum were required, as well, to ensure performance. The prohibitive risks attached to 
betrothal instruments surely discouraged commoners from employing them. Above all, the short 
intervals between betrothals and subsequent marriages inhibited the widespread use of notarized 
sponsalia contracts. 
The process of identifying the crucial differences between arrhae and a penalty was laborious, and 
the distinguishing traits, as elaborated by the jurists, were ultimately problematic. Similarly, the 
custom of giving a pledge (pignus) instead of cash posed a dilemma: should the value of the object 
pledged be treated symbolically or materially? While in the second case the pledge may be 
considered as an equivalent of arrhae given in cash, in the first it may not and thus it falls outside 
the dispositions of l. Mulier on arrhae. Additionally, the reciprocal exchange and acknowledgment 
of arrhae called into question the neatly devised system medieval jurists inherited from Roman 
law. Nonetheless, jurists succeeded in unmasking frauds, especially in the form of the fictitious and 
reciprocal acknowledgment of arrhae. Since the value of arrhae corresponded approximately to 
that of dowries, the jurists failed in their attempt to limit arrhae to a small amount of cash actually 
transferred from one party to another. Of long-lasting significance was the jurists’ effective defense 
of an aggrieved party’s ability to mount an action ad interesse against the breaching party in order 
to recover expenditures made in anticipation of marriage. 
The multiple and varied and sources of law of the late Middle Ages constituted a socio-legal reality 
far removed from contemporary regulations governing premarital procedures across Europe and 
the United States1 5 5 . Today, civil law regulations are almost always based on the monopoly of codes 
and statutes uniformly applied within the jurisdiction of each country and within each of the fifty 
U. S. states. Depending on the domicile of the parties, compulsory premarital procedures in 
Europe and the United States usually consist of premarital counseling, attestation of residence, the 
production of a birth, divorce, or death certificates (of a former spouse), and the procurement of a 
marriage license. In Italy, notice of the future marriage must be posted for a minimum of eight 
days in the town hall of the locality where the couple resides in order to allow interested parties to 
raise impediments. In addition, all civ il marriages must be recorded in a public registry1 5 6 . These 
compulsory procedures were introduced by governments over the course of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries for the purpose of regularizing and controlling the formation of marriage. One 
important result of these procedures is that present-day suits resulting from both broken promises 
to marry and divorce largely concern claims over property, rather than challenges to the validity of 
the marriage itself. By contrast, the ease by which betrothals and marriages were contracted in the 
late Middle Ages inevitably resulted in myriad disputes over the very validity of betrothals and 
marriages. 
                                                 
154 For reasons prompting families to enter into a betrothal contract, see SALATIELE, Ars notaria, G. Orlandelli (ed) 
(Milan 1961), pp. 178-179. In gloss servare  added to the model instrument of sponsalia, Salatiele wrote: “nota quod 
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156 M. TIMOTEO, “Family Law in Italy”, in Family Law in Europe , C. Hamilton and Kate Standley (edd) (London, 
Dublin, Edinburgh 1995), p. 268. 
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A persistent theme in the broken-promise-to-marry scholarship and in fictional literature is that 
from the Middle Ages to the present unscrupulous men have tricked credulous women with sex-
motivated promises to marry1 5 7 . In the late Middle Ages, paternalistic church and secular courts 
consistently sought to compel male seducers to marry their victims. Such suits typically involved 
low-status families and individuals. At the same time, church courts favored plaintiffs, regardless 
of gender, seeking to enforce informal betrothal and marriage vows. In the absence of an action at 
civil law to initiate a suit over a broken promise to marry, high-status families, like the merchant 
families of Florence, tended to rely on notarized betrothal contracts to avoid the suits and troubles 
attending informal promises to marry. Our research indicates that betrothal contracts, with their 
detailed specification of performance contingencies - principally large amounts of compensation 
and automatic judgment against the breaching party - succeeded in minimizing the occurrence of 
broken promises to marry. 
The experience of Florence differed from that of nineteenth-century England and the United States, 
countries in which a common law action for breach of promise to marry was well established and 
was used to launch thousands of suits. The large majority of plaintiffs were lower- and middle-
class women seeking pecuniary compensation from ex-fiancés who, they asserted, had failed to 
keep their promises to marry. As Frost has shown, jilted women in Victorian England easily 
persuaded sympathetic judges and juries that they were deserving of compensation for unwanted 
pregnancies, lost jobs, careers forgone, humiliation, and emotional wounds. Compensation was 
especially needed for women who had already invested in costly wedding preparations. Frost 
appropriately admires these jilted women for asserting their rights1 5 8 . Yet, there is also a paradox 
that in doing so they had to portray themselves as passive victims, and as Coombs observes, this 
portrayal was “contradicted by the very action of bringing suit”1 5 9 . It is not surprising that these 
women became the objects of caustic criticism from legal and moral pundits and social critics like 
Charles Dickens (Pickwick Papers, 1836) and Gilbert and Sullivan (Trial by Jury, 1875). For them, 
female plaintiffs were heartless gold diggers and extortionists. Despite objections, the common law 
action of breach of promise to marry continued to be used by women to repair their lives well up 
until 1945. Only in 1970 did Parliament abolish the action. 
U.S. state courts and legislatures in the twentieth century have significantly curtailed the ability of 
jilted women to win suits over broken promises to marry. According to Tushnett, “the idea of pure, 
romantic, non-materialistic love became so powerful over the course of the twentieth century that 
courts could no longer fully analyze the ways in which the economics of marriages and planned 
marriages were linked to the emotions surrounding them. This shift in understanding worked 
against many women’s material interests, as once-common and oft-successful female plaintiffs 
disappeared from the case reporters”.1 6 0. 
There is yet another contrast. In the late Middle Ages a sworn promise to marry was enforceable 
under canon law and the breaching party was held at fault and compelled to pay compensation. 
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The promise importantly entailed a change in the promisor’s legal status. It was unlawful for the 
party already betrothed to make a promise of future marriage to another party. Today, in Europe 
and the United States, an individual’s legal status is not at all altered upon the exchange of 
promises to marry or upon the performance of premarital requirements prescribed by law1 6 1 . 
Under Italy’s Codice Civile (1865), a mutual exchange of a promise to marry in the future is not 
binding (art. 53). The breaching party, however, may be liable for compensation, where the 
promise was rendered by a party of legal age, or a minor with proper authorization, in an atto 
publico (a declaration made before a public official attested by a sealed document, or a document 
redacted by a public notary), or in a scritta privata (one drafted by the parties themselves). In that 
event, the party who declines, without a sound reason, to fulfill the promise must compensate the 
aggrieved party for expenditures made in preparation for marriage (art. 54). The amount of 
damages must be limited to actual prenuptial expenditures. These provisions on prenuptial 
procedures, with minor modifications, remain in force (Codice Civile, art. 79-81) 1 6 2 . Further, a 
standard textbook on contemporary Italian family law, echoing medieval doctrines, stresses that a 
penal stipulation attached to a “promessa di matrimonio” has no legal force or effect1 6 3 . 
State legislatures and courts in the United States take a minimalist approach and are no longer 
willing to assign fault to the party breaking a promise to marry or to grant compensation to the 
aggrieved party, even for expenditures made in anticipation of future marriage. Under current U.S. 
legal doctrines and case law, the value of a promise to marry may not be assigned a price. 
American women think otherwise. According to recent surveys, women overwhelmingly consider 
the engagement ring, an object on which Americans of all classes lavish extravagant devotion, a 
down payment that they should be allowed to retain when a fiancé breaks his promise to marry1 6 4 . 
Under U.S. law, however, an ex-fiancé may recover any tangible gift (or its equivalent monetary 
value) given to a woman in anticipation of marriage, particularly the engagement ring, which today 
frequently costs thousands of dollars1 6 5 . In Italy, either party, having exchanged promises of future 
marriage, may demand the return of gifts (including love letters, photographs, and jewelry) given 
in anticipation of marriage, except where other arrangements for the disposition of the gifts had 
been made by contract (Codice Civile, art. 80)1 6 6 . 
The contrasts we have pointed out must not mask the robustness, through the centuries and in 
radically dissimilar historical settings, of promises of future marriage. In fact, betrothal promises, 
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which have been the exclusive preserve of heterosexual couples, are now made by same-sex 
couples in Europe, the United States, and Canada. In Italy, the cities of Florence and Pisa have led 
the way in permitting same-sex couples to register as domestic partners. With regard to medieval 
Italy, further exploration of archival and legal sources is necessary to better understand the 
function of sponsalia among diverse social groups and regions. The basic questions of who 
contracted betrothals and where, when, and how they were contracted remain to be answered. The 
different and conflicting material and emotional meanings attributed to betrothal promises by 
communities, legal authorities, yesterday’s patriarchal families, and today’s autonomous and self-
fashioning individuals constitute a fascinating, ongoing chapter in comparative socio-legal history. 
